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SUMMARY
Today’s cybercriminals must carefully manage their network resources to evade
detection and maintain profitable businesses. For example, a rogue online enterprise has
to have multiple technical and business components in place, to provide the necessary in-
frastructure to keep the business available. Often, cybercriminals in their effort to protect
and maintain their valuable network resources (infrastructures), they manipulate two fun-
damental Internet protocols; the Domain Name System (DNS) and the Border Gateway
Protocol (BGP).
A popular countermeasure against cybercriminal infrastructures are Autonomous Sys-
tems (AS) reputation systems. Past research efforts have developed several AS reputation
systems that monitor the traffic for illicit activities. Unfortunately, these systems have se-
vere limitations; (1) they cannot distinguish between malicious and legitimate but abused
ASes, and thus it is not clear how to use them in practice, (2) require direct observation of
malicious activity, from many different vantage points and for an extended period of time,
thus delaying detection.
This dissertation presents empirical studies and a system that help to counteract cy-
becriminal infrastructures. First, we perform empirical studies that help to advance our
understanding, about how these infrastructures operate. We study two representative types
of infrastructures: (1) fast-flux service networks which are infrastructures based on DNS
manipulation, (b) malicious ASes (hubs of cybercriminal activities) which are infrastruc-
tures that are primarily based on BGP manipulation. Second, we build on our observations
from these studies, and we design and implement, ASwatch; an AS reputation system that,
unlike existing approaches, monitors exclusively the routing level behavior of ASes, to ex-
pose malicious ASes sooner. We build ASwatch based on the intuition that, in an attempt
xi
to evade possible detection and remediation efforts, malicious ASes exhibit agile routing
behavior (e.g. short-lived routes, aggressive re-wiring). We evaluate ASwatch on known





Today’s cybercriminals must carefully manage their network resources to evade detection
and maintain profitable businesses. For example, a rogue online enterprise has to have mul-
tiple technical and business components in place, to provide the necessary infrastructure to
keep the business available and profitable. Some elements of the technical components,
may include botnet services, domain registration services, name servers, and hosting or
proxy services. Cybercriminals take measures to protect these resources; for example, bot-
masters protect their botnet command-and-control (C&C) servers from take-downs, spam-
mers secure spam delivery by rotating IP addresses to evade trivial blacklisting, and illicit
business operators protect scam hosting services by setting up proxies, etc. We refer to the
distribution, maintenance and protection of these resources as operations. We refer to the
network resources that support these operations as infrastructure.
For example, Figure 1 illustrates the infrastructure that supports the operations of: (1)
an illicit pharmaceutical business (Figure 1(b)) and (2) a malware which attacks point of
sales (PoS) systems (Figure 1(a)). In the case of the illicit pharmaceutical business, the
infrastructure involves a spamming botnet, servers that provide domain registration, name
service, web hosting and payment. In the case of the PoS malware, named Poseidon, the
malware targets PoS systems, and infects machines to access the memory for credit card
information, which exfiltrates at a later time. The infrastructure includes a command and
control (C&C) server, file servers and exflitration servers.
Often, cyber-criminals in their effort to maintain and protect their infrastructure, they
manipulate two fundamental internet protocols that are critical for connectivity, namely the
Domain Name System (DNS) and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).
Examples of how cybercriminals manipulate DNS to maintain and protect their infras-
tructures, include DNS based botnets, and scam hosting using fast flux service networks
(FFSN). Figure 2(a) shows an example infrastructure of a FFSN. Somewhat similar to a
technique used by content distribution networks (CDNs) such as Akamai, a fast-flux do-
main is served by many distributed machines and short time-to-live (TTL) values are used
to quickly change a mapping between a domain and an IP address. However, the hosts
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(b) Illicit online business infrastructure.
Figure 1: Example cyber-criminal infrastructures; 1(a) illustrates the poseidon malware
infrastructure as described by Cisco security blog post [18], 1(b) illustrates the infrastruc-
ture involved to support an illicit pharmaceutical business, as described by [62].
actual content, these zombies often act as front-end proxies that relay messages between
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a client and a mothership node. Consequently, using this fast flux technique, cybercrim-
inals can easily throw in and out a large number of compromised hosts as needed while
effectively hiding their mothership node.
Examples of how cybercriminals manipulate BGP to maintain and protect their infras-
tructures, include short-lived prefix announcements to perform an illicit operation (e.g.large
volumes of spam, prefix hijacking), hosting their services in a dedicated AS (called bullet-
proof AS) which is often connected to a masking upstream provider. Figure 2(b) shows
an example of the latter case. We show the upstream and downstream connectivity of a
crime-friendly AS, Troyak, around the time it was reported in a blog. Before the report, it
was connected with ASes Root, Ihome, and Oversun-Mercury. After the blog report, AS
Troyak lost all of its upstream providers and relied on a peering relationship with AS Ya
for connectivity. After the report, AS Troyak and its customers went offline. We refer to an
AS as malicious, if it is managed and operated by cybercriminals, and if its main purpose is
to support illicit network activities (e.g., phishing, malware distribution, botnets). In con-
trast, we refer to an AS as legitimate, if its main purpose is to provide legitimate Internet
services. In some cases, a legitimate AS’s IP address space may be abused by cybercrimi-
nals to host malicious activities (e.g., sending spam, hosting a botnet command-and-control
server). Such abuse is distinct from those cases where cybercriminals operate and manage
the AS.
1.1.1 Challenges of defenses against cyber-criminal infrastructures
We describe the challenges that researchers face, to design defenses against cybercriminal
infrastructures. These challenges motivate the measurement studies that we perform, and
the detection system that we develop in this dissertation.
Distinguishing between malicious and abused ASes.
A countermeasure against cybercriminal infrastructures are AS reputation systems. The
community has developed several AS reputation systems that monitor data-plane traffic
for illicit activities. Existing AS reputation systems typically monitor network traffic from
different vantage points to detect the presence of either malware-infected machines that
contact their C&C servers, send spam, host phishing or scam websites, or perform other
illicit activities. These systems establish AS reputation by measuring the “density” of ma-
licious network activities hosted within an AS. For instance, FIRE [101] tracks the number
of botnet C&C and drive-by malware download servers within an AS. ASes that host a
large concentration of malware-related servers are then assigned a low reputation. Simi-
larly, Hostexploit [35] and BGP Ranking [12] compute the reputation of an AS based on
data collected from sources such as DShield [26] and a variety of IP and domain name
3
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(b) Malicious ASes rewire and hide behind masking upstream ASes: an example of
BGP manipulation
Figure 2: Cyber-criminals manipulate critical Internet protocols to maintain and protect
their infrastructures. Examples of DNS 2(a) and BGP 2(b) manipulation.
blacklists.
Unfortunately, these existing AS reputation systems have a number of limitations:
(1) They cannot distinguish between malicious and legitimate but abused ASes. Legitimate
ASes often unwillingly host malicious network activities (e.g., C&C servers, phishing sites)
simply because the machines that they host are abused. For example, AS 26496 (GoDaddy)
and AS 15169 (Google) repeatedly appeared for years among the ASes with lowest reputa-
tion, as reported by Hostexploit. Although these ASes are legitimate and typically respond
to abuse complaints with corrective actions, they may simply be unable to keep pace with
the level of abuse within their network. On the other hand, malicious ASes are typically
4
unresponsive to security complaints and subject to law-enforcement takedown. (2) Because
of the inability to distinguish between malicious and legitimate but abused ASes, it is not
clear how to use the existing AS rankings to defend against malicious ASes. (3) Existing
AS reputation systems require direct observation of malicious activity from many different
vantage points and for an extended period of time, thus delaying detection.
Limitations of defenses against DNS-based infrastructures.
In the case of infrastructures that are based on DNS manipulation, most defense ap-
proaches have naturally focused on exposing the associated domain names. Unfortunately,
DNS-based infrastructures are highly agile, and they often exhibit high ”churn” rates. For
example a botnet may iterate over thousands of domains names and IP addresses over the
course of a few days [88]. Domain names are a cheaper resource in comparison to IP ad-
dresses [71,72], and thus we expect IP addresses to be ”consumed” at a lower rate than the
associated domain names. Thus, focusing primarily on the domain names, even though it
is effective for early exposure of malicious domains names, it maybe not enough to keep
up with the hosting IPs of DNS-based infrastructures.
1.1.2 Understanding malicious infrastructures and designing control-plane based
defenses.
Thesis Statement: This dissertation counteracts cybercriminal infrastructures by targeting
malicious ASes, which are hubs of cybercriminal operations. We demonstrate that it is
possible to achieve more accurate and earlier detection of malicious ASes, by monitoring
the control-plane AS behavior. We perform empirical studies that help to advance our
understanding of how cyber-criminals manipulate two critical Internet protocols - DNS and
BGP - to maintain and protect their infrastructures. We then build on this understanding,
to design and implement an AS reputation system, to expose malicious rather than abused
ASes.
This dissertation makes the following contributions in defense of the thesis statement:
• We present an empirical study of the dynamics of fast-flux service networks - a rep-
resentative DNS based infrastructure - as they are used to host point-of-sale sites for
email scam campaigns. We actively monitor the DNS records for URLs for scam
campaigns received at a large spam sinkhole over a one-month period to study the
rates of change in fast-flux networks, the locations in the DNS hierarchy that change,
and the extent to which the fast-flux network infrastructure is shared across different
campaigns.
• We present the first systematic study of the re-wiring dynamics of malicious ASes.
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We track the ASes that were listed by Hostexploit over a period of two years and
compared their AS-level re-wiring dynamics with non-reported ASes. Using a pub-
licly available dataset of Customer-Provider (CP) relations in the Internets AS graph,
we study how interconnection between autonomous systems evolves, both for ASes
that provide connectivity for attackers and ASes that were not reported as malicious.
• We present a fundamentally different approach to establishing AS reputation. We
design and implement a system, ASwatch, that aims to identify malicious ASes using
exclusively control-plane data (i.e., the BGP routing control messages exchanged
between ASes using BGP). Unlike existing data-plane based reputation systems,
ASwatch explicitly aims to identify malicious ASes, rather than assigning low repu-
tation to legitimate ASes that have unfortunately been abused.
We now elaborate on the contributions:
Understanding the dynamics of FFSN, a DNS based infrastructure. We study the
roles of fast-flux nodes in hosting different parts of the infrastructure (e.g., authoritative
name server, Web server, or spammer) and how these roles evolve over time. We study:
(a) the rates at which fast-flux networks redirect clients to different authoritative name
servers, or to different Web sites entirely. (b) The extent to which individual fast-flux
networks “recruit” new IP addresses and how the rate of growth varies across different
scam campaigns. (c) the location of change; the extent to which fast-flux networks change
the Web servers to which clients are redirected. (d) the use and sharing of infrastructure.
We study the geographical and topological locations of fast-flux hosts (both authoritative
nameservers and Web servers), as well as how fast-flux infrastructure is shared over time,
across scam campaigns, and between spamming and hosting infrastructure.
The fist systematic study to understand the control-plane behavior of malicious ASes.
We track reported ASes and non-reported ASes, with the goal of improving our understand-
ing of how malicious networks exploit interconnection through different upstream ASes to
cover their traces. Rather than attempting to detect any individual type of attack (e.g., spam,
denial of service), we characterize the re-wiring activity of malicious networks that are pri-
marily responsible for attacker activities. This preliminary study motivated us to design
ASwatch.
Designing control-plane features to capture the behavior of malicious ASes. The
main intuition behind ASwatch is that malicious ASes may manipulate the Internet rout-
ing system, in ways that legitimate ASes do not, in an attempt to evade current detection
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and remediation efforts. For example, malicious ASes “rewire” with one another, forming
groups of ASes, often for a relatively short period of time [49]. Only one AS from the
group connects to a legitimate upstream provider, to ensure connectivity and protection for
the group. To capture this intuition, we derive a collection of control-plane features that is
evident solely from BGP traffic observed via Routeviews [86]. We identify three families of
features that aim to capture different aspects of the “agile” control plane behavior typical of
malicious ASes. (1) AS rewiring captures aggressive changes in AS connectivity; (2) BGP
routing dynamics capture routing behavior that may reflect criminal illicit operations; and
(3) Fragmentation and churn of the advertised IP address space capture the partition and
rotation of the advertised IP address space.
An AS reputation system to expose malicious ASes, rather than abused ASes. We
present ASwatch, an AS reputation system that aims to identify malicious ASes by moni-
toring their control plane behavior. We evaluate ASwatch on real cases of malicious ASes.
We collect ground truth information about numerous malicious and legitimate ASes, and
we show that ASwatch can achieve high true positive rates with reasonably low false pos-
itives. We evaluate our statistical features and find that the rewiring features are the most
important. We compare the performance of ASwatch with BGP Ranking, a state-of-the-art
AS reputation system that relies on data-plane information. Our analysis over nearly three
years shows that ASwatch detects about 72% of the malicious ASes that were observable
over this time period, whereas BGP Ranking detects only about 34%.
Practical help for network operators to defend against malicious traffic: Our work
is motivated by the practical help that an AS reputation system, which accurately identifies
malicious ASes, may offer: (1) Network administrators may handle traffic appropriately
from ASes that are likely operated by cyber criminals. (2) Upstream providers may use
reliable AS reputation in the peering decision process (e.g. charge higher a low reputation
customer, or even de-peer early). (3) Law enforcement practitioners may prioritize their
investigations and start early monitoring on ASes, which will likely need remediation steps.
1.1.3 Outline
This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses related work. Chapters 3 and 4
present measurement studies of cyber-criminal infrastructures that rely on DNS and BGP
manipulation, respectively. Chapter 5 presents ASwatch, an AS reputation system that can




The FFSN measurement study appeared as a paper at PAM 2009 [51], and received the best
dataset award. A longer version of this paper is available as a technical report [50]. The
measurement study of rewiring behavior of malicious ASes appeared as a poster at SIG-
COMM 2011 [48], and as a paper at PAM 2012 [49]. ASwatch was presented at NANOG62




In this chapter, we review measurement studies of FFSN, defenses against DNS-based
infrastructures, studies of the structure of online crime, studies of “unclean” ASes and
existing AS reputation systems, as well as applications of machine learning and signal
processing to detect BGP anomalies. Also, we describe how our work relates to these
studies.
2.1 Measurement studies of FFSN
The operation of fast-flux service networks was first described in detail by the Honeynet
Project [102]. By closely monitoring the behavior of fast-flux agents executed in test envi-
ronments, the report showed two different types of fast-flux service networks—single-flux
and double-flux. Their findings provide insights on the changing nature of fast-flux service
networks and lead us to design the multi-level measurement method that form the bases of
our study of dynamics of scam infrastructure.
Holz et al. [33] analyzed fast flux domains using periodic DNS lookups and presented
the characteristics focusing on the diversity of A records and the network locations (AS
numbers) that these A records reside at. They also showed various analysis results includ-
ing the percentage of scam campaigns leveraging fast-flux service networks and the rate at
which new machines are added to fast flux domains for a few selected ones. In addition
to these measurements, we measured the change of fast flux domains at multiple levels
of the DNS hierarchy (A records, NS records, and IPs of NS records) and found many
different structures of fast-flux service networks, some of which are previously unknown.
We also present the geographic and topological distribution of flux hosts, the prevalence
resource sharing found across different scam campaigns, and the relationship between fast-
flux agents and various blacklists.
Previous work observed fast-flux domains via DNS measurement [111]. From the anal-
ysis of passively collected DNS responses at a university gateway, Zdrnja et al. observed
an instance of fast-flux domain that was short lived (only for three days) and resolved to
80 different IP addresses [111]. In comparison, our study actively probes a large number
of suspicious DNS domains to profile different types of fast-flux networks over a longer
period of time.
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Our primary data is drawn from emails collected at a spam trap. Spam traps provide
a window to glimpse into the underlying network operations of online scammers who use
bulk email for solicitation. Because of relatively easy deployment and data processing,
many previous studies used email collected at spam traps for measuring the effectiveness of
DNS-based blacklists [44], studying the network-level behavior of spammers [82], charac-
terizing the scam hosting infrastructure [6], and studying the dynamism of the IP addresses
of spammers [109]. Others have used passive DNS monitoring to study the dynamics of
botnets [22, 79], which are now believed to host fast-flux networks.
Content-based scam campaign clustering is a commonly used technique for analyzing
spammer behavior. Anderson et al. used image fingerprints to group similar Web pages [6].
Holz et al. used strings found from HTML documents for grouping [33]. Pathak et al. pro-
pose that spammers could be clustered into campaigns by looking for relationships across
SMTP connections [76]. In comparison, we used image comparison in addition to string
matches of the names of embedded files of each URL. Although the similarity metric em-
ployed in each work is slightly different, we believe that clustering results would not bear
too much difference.
2.2 Defenses against FFSN and DNS-based cyber-crminal infrastruc-
tures
FFSN detection systems: Earlier approaches, [33, 73, 75] studied fast-flux domains ad-
vertised through spam email messages and attempted to detect them as follows: collected
spam emails, extracted the urls advertised through these messages, and extracted features
features from the urls, then performed active probing (repeated DNS queries to collect the
resolved IP addresses) and classified each individual domain as fast-flux.
In contrast, Fluxbuster [77] was based on passive analysis of recursive DNS traces
collected from large ISPs, to classify entire groups of domains into fast-flux or non-fast-
flux. More specifically, they deployed a sensor in front of the recursive DNS server of large
ISPs, to passively monitor the DNS queries and responses from the clients, and applied
prefiltering rules to selectively store information about potential fast-flux domains, into a
central DNS data collector. Finally, they clustered relative domains together, they extracted
features from these groups (e.g.total number of resolved IPs, diversity of BGP prefixes),
and classified each group of domains as likely fast-flux or not.
Botnet takedowns: Nadji et al [71] proposed a methodology to perform effective botnet
takedowns. The authors enumerate the C&C infrastructure (IP addresses that host C&C
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domains from the same botnet). They perform the enumeration using: 1) passive DNS data
to identifying historic relationships between domain names and hosts, and 2) interrogating
malware samples. In earlier work, Nadji et al [72] studied cyber-criminal infrastructures
using graphs; the authors considered as nodes the IP addresses of hosts that perform mali-
cious activities (spam, scam hosting, C&C domain) and draw an edge between two nodes
if they have found historic relationship based on passive DNS data. Then, they applied
community detection algorithms to identify parts of the graph which have are densely con-
nected, and hence likely to belong to the same cyber-criminal network. They also studied
the importance of different parts of the networks, with respect to volumes of DNS queries
performed by the victim clients.
DNS reputation systems: Antonakakis et al [8–10] and Bilge et al [14] developed DNS
reputation systems. These systems build models of known legitimate domains and mali-
cious domains, to compute a reputation score for unknown domains. They primarily rely on
the following types of features: network-based features (e.g.total number of IPs historically
as sociated with a domain), zone-based features (e.g.distinct TLDs, frequency of different
characters in the domain string), and evidence-based features (e.g.distinct malware samples
that contacted the domain or the hosting IP).
2.3 Measurement studies and defenses against malicious networks
Studies of “unclean” ASes. Previous studies have attempted to identify “unclean” ASes,
which are ASes with a high concentration of low reputation IP addresses. In contrast, we
attempt to understand the behavior of ASes that are controlled and managed by attackers,
rather than ASes which are heavily abused. Collins [20] first introduced the term network
uncleanliness as an indicator of the tendency for hosts in a network to become compro-
mised. They gathered IP addresses from datasets of botnets, scan, phishing, and spam
attacks to study spatial and temporal properties of network uncleanliness; this work found
that compromised hosts tend to cluster within unclean networks. Kalafut et al. [45] col-
lected data from popular blacklists, spam data, and DNS domain resolutions. They found
that a small fraction of ASes have over 80% of their routable IP address space blacklisted.
Konte et al. [49] studied ASes that are reported by Hostexploit and how they changed their
upstream connectivity. Johnson et al. introduced metrics for measuring ISP badness [42].
Moura et al. studied Internet bad neighborhoods aggregation. Earlier papers have looked
into IP addresses that host scam websites or part of spamming botnets are organized intro
infrastructures [17,30,110]. Finally, Ramachandran et al. found that most spam originates
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from a relatively small number of ASes, and also quantified the extent to which spammers
use short-lived BGP announcements to send spam [80, 81]. These studies suggest that it is
possible to develop an AS reputation system based on analysis of control-plane features,
which is the focus of our work.
AS reputation systems . The state of the art in AS reputation systems is to use features
that are derived from data-plane information, such as statistics of attack traffic. Current
systems correlate data from multiple sources such as spam, malware, malicious URLs,
spam bots, botnet C&C servers, phishing servers, exploit servers, cyber-warfare provided
by other organizations or companies. Then, then rank ASes based on the concentration of
low reputations IP addresses. Organizations, such as Hostexploit [90], Sitevet [90], and
BGP Ranking [12] rate each AS with an index based on the activity of the AS weighted
by the size of its allocated address space. FIRE [101] examines datasets of IRC-based bot-
nets, HTdetection-based botnets, drive-by-download and phishing hosts and scores ASes
based on the longevity of the malicious services they host and the concentration of bad
IP addresses that are actively involved. ASMATRA [107] attempts to detecting ASes that
provide upstream connectivity for malicious ASes, without being malicious themselves.
Zhang et al. [113] find that there is a correlation between networks that are misman-
aged and networks that are responsible for malicious activities. The authors use a misman-
agement metric to indicate which ASes may be likely to exhibit malicious behaviors (e.g.
spam, malware infections), which does not necessarily indicate if an AS is actually oper-
ated by cyber-criminals or not. In contrast, we focus on detecting ASes that are operated
by attackers, rather than ASes that are mismanagement and likely abused. Also, [113] ex-
amined short-lived BGP announcements as an indication of BGP misconfigurations. Even
though we also examine the duration of prefix announcements, this is only one of the fea-
tures we use to capture control plane behavior. Our analysis shows that this feature alone
is not enough to distinguish between legitimate and malicious ASes.
Roveta et al. [87] developed BURN, a visualization tool, that displays ASes with ma-
licious activity, with the purpose to identify misbehaving networks. In contrast to these
reputation systems that rely on data-plane observations of malicious activity from privi-
leged vantage points, ASwatch establishes AS reputation using control-plane (i.e., routing)
features that can be observed without privileged vantage points and often before an attack.
Machine learning and signal processing approaches. These approaches detect BGP
anomalies (e.g., burstiness), with the goal to help system administrators diagnose problem-
atic network behaviors, but they do not provide a connection between BGP anomalies and
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criminal activity. In contrast to these approaches, ASwatch attempts to capture suspicious
control-plane behavior (e.g., aggressive change of connectivity, short BGP announcements)
with the goal to detect malicious ASes. Prakash et al. developed BGPlens, which mon-
itors anomalies by observing statistical anomalies in BGP updates based on analysis of
several features, including self-similarity, power-law, and lognormal marginals [78]. Sim-
ilarly, Mai [66], Zhang [112] and Al-Rousan [3] have examined BGP update messages
using tools based on self-similarity and wavelets analysis hidden Markov models to design
anomaly detection mechanisms.
2.4 Designing disincentives for cyber-criminal activities
Leontiadis et al. [57] studied empirically different types of online criminal networks with
the goal to: a) identify common business characteristics across cyber-criminal networks,
and b) identify common economic pressure points that may help to make cyber-crime less
profitable. More specifically, Leontiadis et al. studied the following types of criminal
activities: 1) online prescription drug trade [59–61], 2) exploitation of trending news topics
and of prescription drugs [69], and 3) WHOIS misuse [58].
The authors empirically identified the following common components across these
three types of criminal businesses: 1) search engines; they play an important role providing
the means for cyber-criminals to engage victims, 2) payment networks; they provide means
of monetization of the activities, 3) registrars and internet service providers; they provide
the necessary resources, 4) law enforcement: the authors suggest that international cooper-
ation along with targeted efforts may have the best results for taking down cyber-criminal
business that span across countries and hosting providers.
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CHAPTER III
FAST FLUX SERVICE NETWORKS: DYNAMICS AND ROLES IN
HOSTING ONLINE SCAMS
3.1 Introduction
Online scams require victims to contact a point-of-sale Web site, which must be both highly
available and dynamic enough to evade detection and blocking. Until recently, many sites
for a scam were hosted by a single IP address for a considerable amount of time (i.e., up
to a week) [6]; unfortunately, the relatively static nature of these sites made it possible to
block scams with simple countermeasures, such as blocking the IP address. To maintain
sites that are both dynamic and highly available, cybercriminals are increasingly using fast
flux—a DNS-based technique used by botnets to rapidly change these delivery sites.
In this chapter, we find that the scam infrastructure has become considerably more so-
phisticated and dynamic. Indeed, in this chapter we show that attackers have developed a
sophisticated infrastructure for directing victims to scam sites that move around frequently
to evade detection and blocking. Attackers that mount scam campaigns appear to be mak-
ing extensive use of fast-flux service networks [40], which can dynamically (and quickly)
redirect clients to different sites for hosting scams. The machines that host content are typ-
ically ephemeral (i.e., they may simply be compromised machines) and distinct from the
controllers that provide content and control redirections.
This chapter studies the dynamics of fast-flux service networks as they are used to host
point-of-sale sites for email scam campaigns. We study the scam sites that were hosted by
more than 350 domains as part of 21 scam campaigns in over 115,000 emails collected over
the course of a month at a large spam simkhole. We study characteristics of dynamics of
the infrastructure hosting fast-flux service networks, the roles that various machines play in
hosting online scams, and the effectiveness of various blacklists at identifying IP addresses
and URLs of scam sites.
Previous work has studied the rates at which fast-flux networks change DNS A-record
mappings (i.e., name to IP address mappings) and the rate at which new IP addresses are
accumulated [33]; this chapter presents many new classes of findings. First, we study fast-
flux networks by campaign to determine whether dynamics differ across campaigns, and
whether distinct spam campaigns share fast-flux service infrastructure. Second, we perform
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Table 1: Summary of results.
Finding Table/Figure Implications
Dynamics
Rates of change. DNS records change more quickly than
TTL values. NS records are more stable than A records or
IPs of NS records. DNS records for fast flux domains change
more quickly than those from “legitimate” popular domains.
Fig. 5, Fig. 6 Blacklisting authoritative name server names may
help with fast-flux mitigation.
Rates of accumulation. Different scam campaigns (and
URLs for those campaigns) recruit new IP addresses at dif-
ferent rates
Fig. 8 The rate at which a URL “accumulates” new IP ad-
dresses may help detect fast flux networks and also
identify scam campaigns.
Location of change in DNS hierarchy. Different fast-flux
domains change at different locations in the DNS hierarchy
(i.e., A records, IP of NS record, NS record).
Tab. 3.4.2
Roles
Sharing. Different scam campaigns share fast-flux infras-
tructure
Tab. 3, Tab. 4,
Tab. 9 Identifying fast-flux infrastructure may help with
early detection of scam campaigns.
Distribution across /24s. Fast flux domains return A
records that are distributed over a far larger set of /24s than
legitimate popular Web sites (as seen when queried from a
single DNS location).
Fig. 11 The distribution of query results across IP address
space may be useful for detecting fast-flux activity.
Distribution in IP address space. A and NS records are
distributed across IP address space, but some regions have a
high density of both fast-flux agents and spammers.
Fig. 9 Detection of spammers might also help detect fast-
flux networks, and vice versa.
Blacklists. Some IP addresses that appear as flux agents
appear in spam and exploit blacklists weeks later.
Fig. 12, Tab. 10,
Tab. 11 Identification of FF infrastructures can help towards
earlier blacklisting of spam/exploit IPs and vice
versa.
continual and iterative DNS monitoring to discover the locations in the DNS hierarchy
where fast-flux networks dynamically redirect clients. Finally, we study the roles of fast-
flux nodes in hosting different parts of the infrastructure (e.g., authoritative name server,
Web server, or spammer) and how these roles evolve over time.
Table 3.1 summarizes the findings of our study and possible implications for these
findings. We present findings regarding the following aspects of fast-flux networks:
• Rate of change. We examine the rates at which fast-flux networks redirect clients
to different authoritative name servers (either by changing the authoritative name-
server’s name or IP address), or to different Web sites entirely. We find that, while
the DNS TTL values do not differ fundamentally from other sites that do DNS-based
load balancing, the rates of change (1) differ fundamentally from legitimate load
balancing activities; (2) differ across individual scam campaigns.
• Rate of accumulation (“recruit”). We study the extent to which individual fast-flux
networks “recruit” new IP addresses and how the rate of growth varies across differ-
ent scam campaigns. We find that, while there is a considerable amount of sharing of
IP addresses across different scam campaigns, different campaigns accumulate new
IP addresses at different rates.
• Location of change. We study the extent to which fast-flux networks change the Web
servers to which clients are redirected. We infer the location of change by monitoring
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any changes of (1) the authoritative nameservers for the domains that clients resolve
(the NS record, or the IP address associated with an NS record) or of (2) the mapping
of the domain name to the IP address itself (the A record for the name). We find
that behavior differs by campaign, but that many scam campaigns redirect clients
by changing all three types of mappings, whereas most legitimate load-balancing
activities only involve changes to A records.
• Use and sharing of infrastructure. We study the geographical and topological loca-
tions of fast-flux hosts (both authoritative nameservers and Web servers), as well as
how fast-flux infrastructure is shared over time, across scam campaigns, and between
spamming and hosting infrastructure. We find that different scam campaigns share
fast-flux infrastructure; we also find overlap between spamming infrastructure and
online scam hosting infrastructure.
Our findings lend insights into the operation of fast-flux networks that may ultimately lead
to more effective mitigation techniques: Although scam campaigns are short-lived, the
infrastructure that hosts these scams (i.e., the fast-flux network or networks) appears to
have relatively invariant features that may prove useful for identifying scams and the spam
messages that advertise them.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes background on
fast-flux networks, current understanding about their roles in hosting online scams, and re-
lated work in studying fast-flux networks. Section 3.3 describes our data collection meth-
ods, as well as various limitations of our dataset. Section 3.4 describes the dynamics of
fast-flux service networks that we observed hosting 21 different spam campaigns over the
course of a month. Section 3.5 describes the roles that we observed each IP address playing
in the fast flux networks, the locations of spammers and fast flux infrastructure in the IP
address space, and the sharing of infrastructure across different roles. Section 3.6 describes
the relationships between when various blacklists listed IP addresses and when these IP
addresses were seen in the fast-flux hosting infrastructure that we observed in our data.
Section 3.7 concludes with a summary and discussion of future work.
3.2 Background
We describe main redirection techniques commonly employed by fast flux service networks
and show an example illustrating how this technique can be observed from DNS responses.
We then discuss related work.
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3.2.1 Fast-Flux Mechanics
Fast flux is a DNS-based method that cybercriminals use in order to organise, sustain and
protect their service infrastructures such as illegal web hosting and spamming [102]. Mul-
tiple cybercriminal families have been observed to use the fast flux techniques for illegal
or fake online businesses, phishing sites, adult content sites [91]. Somewhat similar to a
technique used by content distribution networks (CDNs) such as Akamai, a fast-flux do-
main is served by many distributed machines and short time-to-live (TTL) values are used
to quickly change a mapping between a domain and an IP address. However, the hosts
involved for serving a fast-flux domain are botnet zombie drones and instead of hosting
actual content, these zombies often act as front-end proxies that relay messages between
a client and a “mothership” node [102]. Consequently, using this fast flux technique, cy-
bercriminals can easily throw in and out a large number of compromised hosts as needed
while effectively hiding their mothership node.
Variations of the technique also exist [102]. In addition to fluctuating address records
(A records), a fast-flux domain can have changing name servers records (NS records or IP
addresses of NS records). In practice, any combinations of DNS record fluctuations can be
used for flexible and resilient operations. Moreover, as we will show in Section 3.4.3, many
hosts exploited by fast-flux service networks are found to play the role of both a hosting
server (or a front end proxy of it) and an authoritative name server (or a front end proxy of
it).
The dynamics of fast-flux service networks make ineffective the existing mitigation
scheme that relies on blacklisting offending hosts. Operators of such networks can simply
swap out blacklisted hosts. Moreover, by constantly monitoring the “health” of individual
hosts, the operators can increase service availability from likely unstable compromised
machines. To demonstrate how quickly fast-flux service networks change, we show an
example of a fast-flux domain that we monitored on January 20, 2008 at 20:51:52 GMT.
The fast-flux domain is called pathsouth.com and at that time it was pointing to one
of illegal pharmaceutical companies called Canadian Pharmacy [95]. Table 3.2.1 shows
the DNS records resulted from two lookups with seven minutes apart. The first column
shows the IP addresses of spam sources, from which our spamtrap received copies of spam
containing the fast-flux domain. The ten records in bold show that the domain swapped in
nine new hosts for serving content and one new name server.
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Table 2: DNS lookup results of the pathsouth.com fluxing domain: The IP addresses
in bold highlight changes between the two lookups six minutes apart.


































































Accordingly, our data collection and processing involves three steps: (1) passive collection
of spam data; (2) active DNS monitoring of domains for scams contained in those spam
messages; (3) clustering of spam and DNS data by campaign. This section describes our
method for collecting spam data and monitoring DNS record changes associated with the
associated scam campaigns. We also describe how we monitor the DNS dynamics of popu-
lar Web sites to use as a baseline for comparison. We then explain how we postprocess the
data to group spam email messages (and the associated DNS data) according to common
campaigns. Finally, we discuss potential limitations of our data collection and analysis
methods.
3.3.1 Data Collection
To amass a collection of domains to monitor for fast-flux behavior, we collected 3,360
distinct domain names that appeared at spam email messages which were collected at a
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Figure 3: Diagram of the data collection; a fixed location iterative resolver is set up. The
resolver starts the queries from a randomly selected root server, every 300 sec for every
domain. Here we feature the same fluxing domain pathsouth.com as in Table 3.2.1.
Our iterative resolver logs all referrals and the DNS records that are returned for every
query, at each level of the DNS hierarchy.
large spam sink hole. To obtain this list of URLs, we used a simple URL pattern matcher
to extract URLs from the bodies of the messages received at the spam trap. We collected
these domains over a period of three months, from October 1, 2007 to December 31, 2007.
Next, we implemented an iterative resolver (at a fixed location) to resolve every do-
main name from this set once every five minutes. Figure 3 shows the method by which
our resolver recorded DNS mappings at each level of DNS resolution, which allows us to
monitor fast-flux networks for DNS changes at three distinct locations in the hierarchy:
(1) the A record; (2) the NS record; and (3) the IP addresses corresponding to the names
in the NS record. To avoid possible caching effects, the resolver randomly selected a DNS
root server at which to start the DNS query. The iterative resolver recorded the answers
received at every level of the DNS hierarchy; we recorded all the referrals and the answers
by the queried DNS servers for every domain.
Due to the sheer number of DNS lookups required to monitor the domains arriving at
the spam trap, the resolver proceeded through the list of domains sequentially: We began by
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resolving the first 120 domains received at the spam trap each day. Every day the resolver
began resolving the next 120 domains on the list. After each domain had been resolved
continously for three weeks, we removed the domain from the list. The resolver operated
from January 14, 2008 to February 9, 2008.
To compare the dynamics of the domains received at the spam trap as part of online
scam campaigns to the DNS dynamics of “legitimate” domains, we used the same iterative
resolution process to study the dynamics of the 500 most popular domains, according to
Alexa [4].
3.3.2 Postprocessing: Scam Campaigns
After collecting spam and DNS data, we restricted our analysis to the domains that had
reachable Web sites and for which we had observed at least one change in any DNS record.
We then clustered the spam messages into scam campaigns. To perform this clustering,
we retrieve content from the URLs in the email messages and cluster emails whose URLs
retrieve common content:
• Snapshots and Web page sources. We used AutoIT [11] to sequentially open each
URL on a browser, wait until the page is loaded, and take a snapshot of the current
page1. While doing so, HTTP Analyzer [41] captures all the HTTP requests and
responses for further analysis.
• Clustering by snapshots. We manually went through snapshot images and cluster
URLs if the site is selling the same products under the same brand name using a sim-
ilar page layout. The clustering is manual and subjective but fairly straightforward.
• Clustering supplemented with file comparison. The image comparison fails in the
case of partially download pages. For example, pathsouth.com, one of the Cana-
dian Pharmacy [95] sites downloads 88 files, of which 85 are jpeg and gif image
files. Slow response, which is often observed from fast flux service networks, al-
lows only a few small none image files to be received until the somewhat gener-
ous 30 second timeout expires, generating an empty looking page when a snapshot
is taken. To make up this shortcoming, for the URLs that are not classified, we
check to see whether the downloaded file names of each URL is a subset of those
of already identified campaign. We find that most of partially downloaded pages
1We used a 30 second timeout value to move on to a next URL if the current site is not reachable. The
AutoIT script was executed on a virtual machine running Windows XP to avoid possible drive-by infection.
We also disabled most security features that display warnings or prompt for approvals as these interfere with
automation.
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are caused by the Canadian Pharmacy campaign sites and that all of them request
canadian pharmacy 2 style.css in common.
Table 3 shows the summary data of 21 campaigns. We denote each campaign with a
category-ID.2 The second column is the number of domain names that we found changing
during our one month measurement period (fluxing domain). The following two columns
show the number of total spam emails containing the fluxing domains that we received at
our spam trap and the total number of sender IPs of those spam emails. The last three
columns summarize our measurement data: the first two numbers are the total distinct
number of IPs returned as A records of domains (IPdomains) and that of IPs returned as A
records of name servers (IPnameservers). the last number is the total distinct number of IPs
from the combined sets (IPdomains ∪ IPnameservers) . For comparison, Table 4 summarizes the
Alexa dataset.
Top campaigns. The top campaign, by the number of hosting servers, is Pharmacy-A. We
believe that it is one of Canadian Pharmacy scam campaigns [95]. The campaign swapped
in at least of 9,448 distinct IP addresses as hosting servers (or front end proxies of them)
for 149 domains over one month. The next two followers are Watch-A [94] and Watch-
B [93], both of which offer replica watches. We note that for these top three campaigns,
the average ratio of A records associated with a domain name is over 50, allowing the
scammers to freely move around among available hosting servers. However, the remaining
campaigns are rather modest and we even see the sharing of a few hosting servers by
multiple domains (e.g., Pharmacy-D and Links-B appear to have only 5 hosting servers for
50 and 35 domains respectively). Nonetheless, all 21 campaigns exhibited fluxing behavior
in their DNS records to some extent during the measurement period.
Registrars. The fast-flux domains in our dataset are mostly .com (348, or 90.6%). The rest
8.4% are .net (32), .ph (3) and .su (1). However, over 99% of these domains are unique (e.g.,
a.com, b.com)3, requiring separate registrations with the corresponding top-level domains.
Table 5 shows registrar information of the 384 fast-flux domains that we found on May 7,
2008 via jwhois queries. 70% of the domains are still marked as active and registered
with eight registrars in China, India, and US. Among these, the three registrars in China are
responsible for 257 fast-flux domains (66% of total or 95% of the active ones). Surprisingly,
all but paycenter.com.cn are ICANN-accredited registrars [38].
2We looked at each Web page snapshot and assigned a category based on offered products.
3Only 4 out of 384 fast-flux domains have the same second-level domain name.
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Table 3: Statistics for fast-flux networks hosting scam campaigns. Campaigns are sorted
by the total number of IP addresses returned from A records as the number indicates the
size of the underlying infrastructure.






IPs of A rec IPs of NS rec IPs of both
A+NS rec
Pharmacy-A 18459 11670 149 149 9448 2340 9705
Watch-A 40681 30411 34 30 1516 225 1572
Watch-B 454 427 43 19 1204 219 1267
Pharmacy-B 371 223 86 52 15 13 22
Casino-A 317 226 6 6 12 12 16
Pharmacy-C 30 4 6 6 12 11 12
Casino-B 15 8 2 1 11 10 17
Links-A 15 8 2 2 10 14 22
Casino-C 4652 4150 9 5 10 14 18
E-Marketing-A 32 4 6 4 8 2 10
Pharmacy-D 37472 28340 52 50 5 5 6
Pharmacy-E 32 25 4 4 5 7 12
Links-B 5663 4573 38 35 5 5 6
Pharmacy-F 2 1 2 2 4 6 10
Pharmacy-G 208 205 2 2 3 8 8
Links-B 4 2 4 2 3 8 11
Service-A 9 1 3 1 2 4 4
Software-A 950 463 5 5 2 4 5
Watch-C 6226 4154 7 5 2 2 2
DomainNames-A 3 3 3 3 2 4 6
Service-B 26 2 2 1 1 3 4
All campaigns 115198 77030 465 384 9521 2421 9821
Table 4: Alexa dataset.
Domains IPs of A rec IPs of NS rec IPs of A+NS rec
Total 500 1048 852 1877
Figure 4 shows the month when these domains were registered. Because our data col-
lection was done before February 2008, all the domains were registered before then. In-
terestingly, however, over 40% were registered in January 2008 and immediately put in
use for serving scams. Further, these domains are still active even after four months and
the 2% of the domains had been active for over 7 months at the time of our measurement.
Unfortunately, our WHOIS lookup is after the fact and thus we are unable to tell whether
the 30% inactive domains as of May 2008 are due to registration expiration or some other
reasons.
3.3.3 Limitations
Our data is derived from spam collected at a single spam trap; different spam traps might
receive different distributions of spam emails from different locations. The relatively high
volume of emails received at our spam trap (6,247,937 messages from the period of Oc-
tober 2007 through February 2008) suggests that the data we have collected may be rep-
resentative of spam and scam campaigns seen at other networks, although our trap may






























Figure 4: Record creation date for the 384 fast-flux domains: Y-axis is the percentage of
the fast-flux domains that were registered on the particular month.
Table 5: Registrars of the 384 fast-flux domains as of May 7, 2008.
Registrar Country Domains
dns.com.cn China 180 ( 46.9%)
paycenter.com.cn China 65 ( 16.9%)
todaynic.com China 12 ( 3.1%)
signdomains.com India 7 ( 1.8%)
leadnetworks.com India 3 ( 0.8%)
coolhandle.com US 2 ( 0.5%)
webair.com US 1 ( 0.3%)
stargateinc.com US 1 ( 0.3%)
total active domains 271 ( 70.6%)
may receive different scams). We sampled our dataset further by only actively monitoring
a subset of the domains contained in URLs received in spam messages at the spam trap;
in particular, we did not analyze domain names that we could not explicitly group into a
scam campaign. Many of the domains that we could not group into a campaign also exhib-
ited highly dynamic behavior, but we omitted these domains from the analysis because we
could not confirm their participation in an online scam.
Unlike a legitimate site, a scam campaign operates under many different domain names
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(e.g., pathsouth.com, yesself.com), possibly to avoid URL blacklisting and perhaps to
spread the risk of being detected and terminated by vigilant registrars. Our dataset may
cover only a subset of these names for each campaign and we are unaware of any clear way
to find out the true number of registered domain names for each scam campaign. However,
in most cases, each domain within a campaign appears to show similar behavior.
In some cases, our DNS resolution process occurred months after the spam message
corresponding to the scam was received at the spam trap. It is possible that the dynamics of
fast-flux networks may differ close to the time of the receipt of the actual spam; however,
our measurements suggest that the dynamics of fast-flux networks for each scam campaign
(i.e., the rate of change of DNS records, the rate of accumulation of new IP addresses)
remain stable over the course of a month, so it may be reasonable to expect similar dynamic
behavior closer to the original receipt of the mail. We were surprised that most domains
remained not only resolvable, but also reachable, even months after receipt of the original
spam email associated with the campaign. This behavior differs from the dynamics of scam
hosting sites observed in previous studies [6], which observed that many scam sites remain
active for only a week; the difference may be due to the rise of fast-flux networks.
Our clustering technique assigns a URL to a single campaign based on snapshots of the
Web site’s content for a single snapshot. It is possible that, over time, a single domain could
be used to host multiple campaigns; in these cases, our analysis would attribute behavior to
a single campaign (i.e., the one corresponding to our snapshot) when, in fact, the domain
was hosting multiple campaigns over the course of our analysis. We did not collect frequent
enough snapshots to detect such behavior.
3.4 Dynamics
This section presents our findings concerning the dynamics of fast-flux service networks.
We study three aspects of dynamics: (1) the rate at which DNS records change at each level
of the hierarchy; (2) the rate at which fast flux networks accumulate new IP addresses (both
overall, and by campaign); and (3) the location in the DNS hierarchy where dynamics are
taking place. To understand the nature of these features with respect to “legitimate” load
balancing behavior, we also analyze the same set of features for 500 popular sites listed
























































































(c) IP of NS records










































































(c) IP of NS records
Figure 6: Cumulative distribution of the average time between changes of A, NS, and IP
of NS records.
3.4.1 Rate of Change
We studied the rates at which domains for online scams changed DNS record mappings and
the corresponding TTL values for these records. We expected that fast-flux domains would
both have short TTL values and exhibit frequent changes in name-to-IP address mappings.
Figure 5 compares the distributions of TTLs between the fluxing domains and the do-
mains in the Alexa data set. The disritubiotn of A record TTLs shows that scam sites have
slightly shorter TTL values than popular Web sites; however, both classes of Web sites have
A records with a wide range TTL values. Even more surprisingly, about 30% of popular
Web sites maintain NS records with TTL values of less than a day, but almost all fast-flux
domains we analyzed had TTL values for NS records of longer than a day. In hindsight,
these results do make sense: many clients visiting scam sites will visit a particular domain
infrequently, and only a small number of times, so the TTL value is less important than the
rate at which the mapping itself is changing (i.e., for new clients that attempt to resolve the
domain).















































































(c) IP of NS records
Figure 7: Cumulative distributions of the average time between changes of A, NS, and IP
of NS records for Pharmacy-A, Watch-A, Watch-B, and Pharmacy-B.
that are returned at Step 6 in Figure 3, and NS names and IP addresses of NS names that
are returned at Step 4. The reason why we record these two separate pieces of information
is because NS names and IP addresses of NS names are not always returned with the A
records of the answer at Step 6; the lack of complete information about the sequence of
lookups in the DNS hierarchy will make it difficult to observe all aspects of the dynamics.
To account for possible load-balancing mechanisms at a higher level of the DNS hi-
erarhcy, we group the responses according to the authoritative server that provided them.
We then perform pairwise comparisons across each group of records. In the case of A
records responses and NS record responses, we consider response as a change if at least
one new record appears since last answer, or if the number of records returned has oth-
erwise changed since the last response. (We do not consider reordering the records as a
change.) In the case ofIP addresses of NS records, we consider the response to be a change
if either NS names appear with different IPs or a new NS name shows up since last reply.
Fast-flux domains change on shorter time intervals than their TTL values. Figure 6
shows a distribution of the average time between changes for each domain across all 21
scam campaigns; each point on the line represents the average time between changes for a
particular domain that we monitored. The distribution shows that fast-flux domains change
hosting servers (A records) and name servers (IP addresses of NS records) more frequently
than popular Web servers do. In particular, the rate of change of IP of NS records is much
more frequent than TTL values of these records, causing possible service disruption for
returning clients. In some cases, for example the IP addresses of NS records, the changes
are significantly more frequent than the TTL values would suggest. The incongruence of
DNS TTL values with the rates at which these records are actually changing could also
prove to be a useful feature for detecting fast-flux behavior.
Domains in the same campaign tend to show similar rates of change. We also
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analyzed the rate of change of DNS records after clustering the fast-flux domains according
to campaign. Figure 7 shows these results for the top 4 campaigns (ranked by the number
of distinct IPs returned in A records for domains hosting the campaigns). The results are
striking: different scam campaigns rotate DNS record mappings at distinct rates, and the
rates at which DNS records for a particular campaign are remapped are similar across all
domains for a particular scam. This finding suggests that it may be possible to use rates of
flux at different levels in the DNS hierarchy as a type of signature for a scam campaign.
3.4.2 Rate of Accumulation
Ideally, we wish to know the size of a fast flux service network at a given moment and to
measure the rate at which the network grows over time. However, in practice, our mea-
surement is limited by the rate at which a flux domain updates its DNS records and what
we present in this section is the rate at which a previously unseen host becomes an active
hosting server (A records of a domain) or a name server (IP addresses of names returned
by NS records).
Using a method similar to the one used by Holz et al. [33], we determine the rate of
“flux” by repeatedly resolving each domain and assigning an increasing sequential ID to
each previously unseen IP address. Figures 8(a) and 8(b) show the total number of distinct
IPs for each fast-flux domain (the y-value of the end of each line) over the first week of
our data collection period (first 2,000 iterations, 300 seconds apart from each other) and
how fast each domain accumulated new hosts (slope). A steeper slope incidates more
rapid accumulation of new IP addresses for that domain. Figure 8(a) shows this statistic
for A records and Figure 8(b) shows the same statistic for IP addresses of NS records of
the domains that belong to campaign Pharmacy-A (top campaign). Interestingly, the rate
of accumulation is much slower (almost an order of magnitude) for hosts used as name
servers, as shown in Figure 8(b).
Many domains in the same campaign have similar accumulation rates. We see
many domains with similar slopes throughout the month. These domains tend to belong to
a same campaign. However, not all the fluxing domains belonging to the same campaign
have similar slops (See Figure 8(c)). One reasonable explanation is that a scam campaign
runs on multiple fast flux networks, each of which has a different rate of recruiting and
swapping in a new host. In any case, it is alarming to see that many fluxing domains can
easily throw in thousands of hosting servers and hundreds of name servers over a month.
Some domains only begin accumulating IP addresses after some period of dor-
mancy. Some domains appear to exhaust available hosts for a while (days to weeks) before
27









































(b) IP of NS records























Pharmacy−A Start of DNS queries
Pharmacy−B, Watch−B Start of DNS queries





(c) A records - Top 4


















Pharmacy−A Start of DNS queries
Pharmacy−B, Watch−B Start of DNS queries





(d) IP of NS records - Top 4
Figure 8: Cumulative number of distinct IPs for the A records and IP addresses of NS
records, for the first week (first 2,000 iterations of data collection) for the Pharmacy-A
domains, and for the top 4 campaigns across the four weeks of data collection.
accumulating new IP addresses. We examined two campaigns that exhibited rapid accumu-
lation of IP addresses after some dormancy. In both cases, only one domain per campaign
begins accumulating IP addresses. These two domains shared exactly the same set of NS
names. These 8 NS names are doing all the work for those two campaigns. We observed
other scams (e.g., the canadian pharmacy as well) where a few domains accumulate IP
addresses faster than others. In addition to accumulation, we also saw attrition: 10% of
fluxing domains became unreachable in the while we were monitoring them. These do-
mains may have been blacklisted and so removed by registrars or by scammers themselves.
Rates of accumulation differ across campaigns. Figures 8(c) and 8(d) show the rate
of accumulation of IP addresses for the top four campaigns for the IP addresses of A records
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Table 6: Location of change for all campaigns, sorted by the total number of distinct IPs
of A records.










Pharmacy-A 149 77 72
Watch-A 30 4 1 24 1
Watch-B 19 18 1
Pharmacy-B 52 5 13 19 15
Casino-A 6 1 5
Pharmacy-C 6 6
Casino-B 1 1
Links-A 2 1 1
Casino-C 5 5
E-Marketing-A 4 4
Pharmacy-D 50 2 3 45
Pharmacy-E 4 4
Links-B 35 1 34
Pharmacy-F 2 2




Watch-C 5 4 1
DomainNames-A 3 3
Service-B 1 1
Total 384 18 52 3 219 1 91
Alexa 500 (domains) 37 5 15 4 1 1
and NS records, respectively. The rate of accumulation for each campaign is higher than
that of each fluxing domain. Because of resource sharing across the domains in a campaign,
the total number of distinct IP addresses for a campaign is fewer than the sum of that of
an individual domain. Section 3.5 will discuss how infrastructure is shared across domains
and across campaigns in more detail.
3.4.3 Location of Change in DNS hierarchy
While it is possible to change any record of your own domain in DNS hierarchy (A, NS,
and IP addresses of NS records), it is substantially more difficult to change NS records or
A records of name server names as this requires updating a parent domain’s (often a top
level domain such as .com) zone file. However, we see many fast-flux domains that freely
change NS records or IP of NS records separately or in combination of other records.
Campaigns change DNS record mappings at different levels of the DNS hierarchy.
Table 3.4.2 shows the type of change for each campaign. In contrast to previous studies [40,
102], we observe many different types of changes in addition to single flux (A records) and
double flux (A + IP of NS). Another notable point is that each campaign tends to use mixes
of techniques (e.g., For Pharmacy-A, 52% of domains are double flux and 48% change all
three types of records). We believe that this is another indication that a campaign operates
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Fluxing domains − IPs of A rec
Alexa − IPs of A rec
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Fluxing domains − IPs of NS rec
Alexa − IPs of NS rec
(b) IP of NS records
Figure 9: Distribution of the IPs of A rec, of autoritative servers and the IPs that sent the
originating spam.
on multiple fast flux service networks.
Table 7: Top 10 ASes by number of IPs.
Top ASes by A Rec Top ASes by IP of NS Rec Top ASes by Spamming IPs
8402 - CORBINA-AS (1232) 12714 TI-AS NetByNet Holding (365) 9121 TTNET (6566)
12714 - TI-AS NetByNet Holding (1127) 3904 - HUTCHISON-AS-AP (260) 6147 Telefonica del Peru (3173)
9304 - HUTCHISON-AS-AP (951) 8402 - CORBINA-AS (224) 22927 Telefonica de Argentina (2726)
7132 - AT& T (511) 7132 - AT& T (121) 5617 TPNET Polish Telecom (2356)
6855 - SK SLOVAK TELECOM (345) 9908 - HKCABLE2-HK-AP (91) 19262 VZGNI-TRANSIT Verizon (2107)
13184 - HANSENET (332) 12695 - DINET-AS (81) 4837 CHINA169-BACKBONE (1697)
12695 - DINET-AS (307) 20597 - ELTEL-AS (72) 7738 Telecomunicacoes da Bahia (1524)
3209 - Arcor IP-Network (270) 13184 - HANSENET(66) 8359 COMSTAR (1436)
8615 - CNT-AS (252) 4766 - KIXS-AS-KR Korea Tel. (60) 4134 CHINANET-BACKBONE (1344)
3320 - DTAG (203) 30784 - ISKRATELECOM-AS(59) 9829 BSNL-NIB (1340)
3.5 Roles
This section describes the roles (e.g., content hosting, name service, spamming) played by
hosts in fast flux service networks and how these roles evolve over time. We first examine
the geographic and topological locations of fast-flux nodes; we also compare these loca-
tions to the spamming hosts that mount the messages in the scam campagins. We then
explore how the roles of fast-flux nodes evolve over time, and how the fast-flux infrastruc-
ture is shared across different scam campaigns.
3.5.1 Location
In this section, we examine the network and geographic location of fast flux hosts and

























































(b) IP of NS records
























































(b) IP of NS records
Figure 11: Distribution of unique /24s that appeared for all records in a reply.
3.5.1.1 Network Location
This section describes how fast-flux IP addressess are spread across IP address space. To
examime whether fast-flux service networks use different portions of the IP space than
the top 500 domains, we plotted the distribution of the IPs across the whole IP range.
Figure 9 shows that fast-flux networks use a different portion of the IP space than sites that
host popular legitimate content: The IPs that host legitimate sites are considerably more
distributed: and more than 30% of these sites are hosted in the 30/8-60/8 IP address range,
which hosted almost none of the scam sites observed in our study.
Fast-flux hosts are concentrated in small regions of IP address space; some spam-
mers are concentrated in slightly different regions. Interestingly, the IP address space
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that hosts fast-flux domains is even more concentrated than that which sends spam adver-
tising the scam campaigns. Although the distributions are ismilarly concentrated in the
80/8 - 90/8 range, there is a much higher concentration of spammers in the 200/8 - 210/8
range (ranges allocated to Latin America and Asia, respectively). These differing distribu-
tions suggest that hosts in different regions of the IP address space do in fact play different
“roles” in spam campaigns.
DNS lookups for fast-flux domains often return much more widely distributed IP
addresses than lookups for legitimate Web sites. Our intuition was that fast-flux net-
works that hosted scame sites would be more distributed across the network than legit-
imate Web hosting sites, particularly from the perspective of DNS queries from a sin-
gle client (even in the case of a distributed content distribution network, DNS queries
would tend to map a single client to nearby Web cache). Figures 10 and 11 show the
distribution of distinct /24s that appear at the answer section of the DNS replies) for
the first record in the reply and for all records in the reply, respectively. It turns out
that a few legitimate domains that are hosted by content distribution networks appear to
have the largest number of distinct /24s contained in a single DNS reply. In particu-
lar, www.runescape.com, www.statcounter.com, www.yahoo.co.jp, www.
monografias.com returns IP addresses in 12, 8, 7, and 6 distinct /24s respectively. We
also observed several legitimate domains which showed a large number of distinct /24s
for their IPs of NS records (which actually reflects good network design because it in-
troduces redundancy). Examples include www.altavista.com, www.geocities.
com, www.runescape.com, www.php.net which had 11, 9, 8, and 7 distinct /24s in
IPs of NS records.
Fast flux domains tend to return IP addresses that are distributed across a larger number
of distinct /24s than legitimate domains. Indeed, roughly 40% of all A records returned
for fast-flux domains were distributed across at least 300 distinct /24s, and many were dis-
tributed across thousands of /24s. In contrast, domains for popular Web sites were never
distributed across more than 12 distinct /24s (when queried from a single location). Thus,
overly widespread distribution of query replies may serve as a strong indicator that a do-
main is indeed hosted by a fast-flux network.
The predominant networks that host fast-flux infrastructure differ from those that
host spammers for the corresponding scam campaigns. Table 7 shows the top ten ASes
by the number of IP addresses for A records (i.e., hosting sites), NS records (i.e., name-
servers), and spammers (as observed in the spam trap). Interestingly, although there is some
overlap between the ASes that host the scam sites and those that host authoritative name-
servers, there is almost no overlap between the ASes that host the sites and nameservers
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for the scams do not overlap much with the ASes hosting the spamming IP addresses. In-
deed, Figure 9 also shows that spammers for the campaigns we observed are more heavily
concentrated in Latin America, Turkey, and the United States, whereas fast-flux hosts are
more concentrated in Asia. The fact that significant differences exist between networks that
host fast-flux infrastructure and those that host spammers suggest that scammers may have
divided the infrastructure into different roles (in Section 3.6, we see that many fast-flux
hosts are not listed on spam blacklists, which is consistent with this observation).
3.5.1.2 Geographic location
Hosting servers and name servers are widely distributed. Table 8 lists country names in
which fast flux nodes are hosted, according to the country of the AS in which they are
hosted. In total, we observed IP addresses for A records in 283 ASes across 50 countries, IP
addresses for NS records in 191 ASes across 40 countries, and IP addresses for spammers
for the corresponding scam campaigns across 2,976 IP addresses across 157 countries.
Although many fast flux nodes appear to be in Russia, Germany, and the US, the long
list of ASes and countries shows that fast flux service networks are truly distributed; this
kind of geographical distribution may be necessary to accommodate the diurnal pattern of
compromised hosts’ uptime [23]. Interestingly, the countries that are referred to by the
most A records are not the same set of countries that host authoritative nameservers for
those domains (as indicated by IP addresses of NS records). In particular, Slovakia, Israel,
and Romania appear to host relatively more nameservers than sites, and China appears to
host relatively more nameservers. This difference in distribution deserves further study;
one possible explanation is that nameserver infrastructure for fast-flux networks must be
more robust than the sites that host scams (which might be relatively transient). countries
3.5.2 Sharing Across Campaigns
In this section, we describe our findings regarding the sharing of the same fast-flux infras-
tructure across multiple scam campaigns.
Many fast-flux machines have dual roles, and different campaigns share hosting
infrastructure. Referring back to Table 3, the last three columns indicate that many host-
ing servers double as name servers (and vice versa). 16 out of 21 campaigns (76%) show
such sharing. On the contrary, we see a clear role separation of the hosts associated with
the domains of the popular Web sites listed by Alexa. We also find significant overlaps
among the hosts involved for the top four campaigns. Table 9 shows that Watch-A and
Watch-B are likely to share the underlying infrastructure—99% of hosting servers, 80% of
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IP of NS Rec
Top Countries by
Spamvertising IPs
Russia (4025) Russia (982) US (6972)
Germany (1207) Hong Kong (425) Turkey (6580)
Hong Kong
(1207)
Germany (216) Russia (5914)
US (606) US (168) Brazil (4606)
Slovakia (391) Korea (154) Argentina (4268)
Korea (350) China (77) China (4041)
Israel (337) Japan (64) Poland (3424)
Japan (248) Taiwan (48) India (3302)
Ukraine (247) Ukraine (40) Peru (3214)
Romania (131) Slovakia (39) Germany (3122)
NS records, and 98% of name servers of Watch-B are common with those used for Watch-
A. Moreover, both campaigns share many of the servers and NS records with Pharmacy-A.
This overlap strongly suggests that the all three campaigns involve same fast-flux service
networks. Interestingly, our observation is consistent with Spam Trackers [91], which at-
tributes all the three scam campaigns to Yambo Financials [92].
3.6 Relationship to Blacklists
In this section, we evaluate whether the IPs that show up as part of the fast-flux net-
work hosting infrastructure appear on various blacklists: (1) the Spamhaus spam blacklist
(SBL/PBL) [98]; (2) the Spamhaus exploit blacklist (XBL) [99]; and (3) the URI black-
list (URIBL) [105]. We find, generally, that the time to blacklisting varies significantly by
blacklist, and that many fast-flux IP addresses are not listed in the SBL; those that are tend
to be listed both before and after we observed fast-flux activity.
Method. To determine whether the IP addresses in our dataset are blacklisted at the
time that we witness them as part of fast-flux infrastructure, or whether they become black-
listed at some later point, we query each blacklists database for historical information about
listing. Georgia Tech actively runs mirrors for SpamHaus SBL/PBL/XBL and for URIBL,
which gives us access to precise information about when each IP address or domain is listed
in the database. We query the following databases:
• XBL, a real-time database of IP addresses of infected machines including open prox-
ies worms/viruses with built-in spam engines, and other types exploits.
• SBL, a realtime database of IP addresses of verified spam sources and spam opera-
tions.
34
Table 9: Sharing among the top 4 campaigns.
Sharing of A records
Pharmacy-A Watch-A Watch-B Pharmacy-B
Total per campaign 9448 1516 1204 15
Pharmacy-A - 1510 1203 1
Watch-A 1510 - 1203 1
Watch-B 1203 1203 - 1
Pharmacy-B 1 1 1 -
Sharing of NS records
Pharmacy-A Watch-A Watch-B Pharmacy-B
Total per campaign 52 14 10 10
Pharmacy-A - 8 8 0
Watch-A 8 - 8 0
Watch-B 8 8 - 0
Pharmacy-B 0 0 0 -
Sharing of IPs of NS records
Pharmacy-A Watch-A Watch-B Pharmacy-B
Total per campaign 2340 225 219 13
Pharmacy-A - 220 215 9
Watch-A 220 - 215 9
Watch-B 215 215 - 6
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Figure 12: CDF of time elapsed between the appearance of an IP address in our dataset,
either as IP of A record or IP of NS record of a fluxing domain and the timestamp of
appearance at Spamhaus BL. Also the same for the fluxing domains and the elapsed time
before they were blacklisted at URIBL.
• PBL, a database of end-user IP address ranges that should not be delivering unauthen-
ticated SMTP email to any Internet mail server except those provided for specifically
by an ISP for that customer’s use.
• URIBL, a realtime blacklist that lists domains that appear in spam and are likely
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Figure 13: CDF of time elapsed between the appearance of an IP address, either as IP
of A record or IP of NS record of a fluxing domain at a blacklist, and the timestamp of
appearance in our dataset (The “opposite” from Figure 12).)
Table 10: IPs of A records, IPs of NS records and domains which were blacklisted be-
fore (B), after (A) or before and after (B+A) when they appeared at our collection of DNS
records.
SBL/PBL XBL
Never B A B+A Never B A B+A Total
A 1692 29 283 7517 265 244 2648 6364 9521
NS 547 7 80 1787 183 98 481 1659 2421
URIBL
Never B A B+A Total
Domains 113 0 138 133 384
Many fast-flux IP addresses and domains do not appear in blacklists at the time
when their activity is first observed. We queried the blacklist data at the end of April
2008 for historical information (back to February 2007) for each IP address and domain
from our dataset. Table 10 shows the number of IPs that were already blacklisted before
we observed them at our dataset, IPs that were blacklisted after we observed them in our
dataset, IPs that were blacklisted as active before and after we observed, and finally IPs
that were never blacklisted (by the time we querried the BLs database). Table 10 shows
that a significant fraction of IP addresses hosting scam infrastructure (more than 17%) were
never listed in the SBL; considerably higher fractions were listed in the XBL and URIBL,
although many of the IP addresses and domains listed in the XBL and URIBL respectively
were only listed after we observed activity from those IP addresses and domains. The lack
of these IP addresses in the SBL could suggest one of two things: (1) the SpamHaus SBL
is incomplete; or (2) the SBL may simply not list this fraction of IP addresses because it
was never used to spam (i.e., it only hosted scam infrastructure).
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Table 11: IPs of A records, IPs of NS records and domains which appeared at our spamtrap
as spam relays before (B), after (A) or before and after (B+A) their time of appearance at
our collection of DNS records.
Not appeared Before After Bef.+After Total
IPs of A rec 9417 11 92 1 9521
IPs of NS rec 2420 5 16 0 2421
Time to listing after activity is observed can vary from hours to weeks, depending
on the blacklist. IP addresses tend to take longer to show up in the Spamhaus SBL.
To determine how long it takes for IP addresses to appear in various blacklists after we
observed their activity, we measured the time between when we observed the IP addresses
participating in fast-flux activity and the time when they were first blacklisted. Figure 12
shows the distribution of these delays. We plot the CDFs of the elapsed times between
appearance and listing for XBL, SBL/PBL, and URIBL.
Most IP addresses are listed relatively quickly (if they are not already listed when we
observe either activity), but for some IP addresses and domains, the time that elapses be-
tween the time we first observe activity and the time an IP address or domain is listed is on
the order of weeks. These delays in listing IP addresses in the SBL suggests that there are
parts of fast-flux networks that are used first as flux agents and later as spam relays. In these
cases, monitoring hosts for fast-flux activity may be useful for predicting future spamming
activity. Figure 13 shows the same distribution, but for IP addresses that were listed before
we observed activity from them in our dataset. Interestingly, most IP addresses that were
listed before we observed their activity were listed in the XBL weeks to months before we
observed them (IP addresses for A records were listed sooner).
We observe a small amount of overlap between IP address that host fast-flux in-
frastructure and those that send spam to our spam trap. To further understand the
relationship between spamming infrastructure and the scam hosting infrastructure, we ex-
amined the overlap between IP addresses that spam and those that host infrastructure: For
each IP address that we observed (IPs of A records and IPs of NS records), we checked
to see whether the IP had sent any spam emails to the same spam trap from which we ex-
tracted the fluxing domains over the period of October 2007 through February 2008 (i.e.,
from nearly three months before the start of our collection of fast flux data until 1 month
after our data collection). Table 11 shows that a very small fraction of IP addresses (about
1%) sent spam to our spam trap either before or after the time when we observed them
as part of the scam hosting infrastructure. The small overlap may simply reflect the fact
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that our trap only sees a fraction of all spam (and spammers). These spamming IPs ad-
vertise the same fast-flux domains that they are hosting, which suggests that the spamming
infrastructure and the hosting infrastructure may be shared.
3.7 Conclusion
This chapter has presented an empirical study of the dynamics and roles of fast-flux net-
works in mounting scam campaigns. We actively monitored the DNS records for URLs
for scam campaigns received at a large spam sinkhole over a one-month period to study
the rates of change in fast-flux networks, the locations in the DNS hierarchy that change,
and the extent to which the fast-flux network infrastructure is shared across different cam-
paigns. We also contrast the dynamics observed in these networks to that used for load
balancing for popular Web sites. Our findings suggest that monitoring the infrastructure
for unusual changes in DNS mappings may be helpful for detecting scams hosted on fast-
flux networks. In future work, we plan to use these features design a detection scheme
that can automatically identify scam campaigns based on invariant properties of the infras-
tructure. We expect that doing so may allow us to detect online scams automatically, and
considerably faster than today’s manual blacklisting mechanisms.
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CHAPTER IV
RE-WIRING ACTIVITY OF MALICIOUS NETWORKS
4.1 Introduction
Securing the Internet’s routing system has been a concern for both network operators and
protocol designers for nearly fifteen years. One of the frequently stated reasons for se-
curing the Internet’s interdomain routing protocol, the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), is
that attackers may use BGP to launch their attacks and hide their traces. Previous work
has exposed some specific techniques that attackers use; for example, Ramachandran et
al. observed that some attackers send spam from short-lived prefixes [80]. Nevertheless,
little is known about how ASes that host these attackers exploit BGP to provide them with
further protection. There have been some publicized cases of malicious ASes—major hubs
of illegal activity—namely Atrivo/Intercage and VolgaHost, that were observed to get fre-
quently de-peered. Eventually they were officially reported and cut off by all providers
in September 2008 and January 2011, respectively. This practice of frequent change in
upstream connectivity and eventual cut-off may constitute a feature that potentially char-
acterizes malicious ASes, regardless of the type of attacks they launch which varies across
time. We refer to the activity that is related with change of connectivity of an AS as re-
wiring activity of this AS.
This chapter presents the first systematic study of the re-wiring activity of malicious
ASes, with the goal of improving our understanding of how malicious networks exploit in-
terconnection through different upstream ASes to cover their tracks. Rather than attempting
to detect any individual type of attack (e.g., spam, denial of service), we characterize the
re-wiring activity of malicious networks that are primarily responsible for attacker activ-
ities. We identify features of the re-wiring behavior that may be more stable across time
than the characteristics of any single attack. We believe that ultimately certain aspects of
routing behavior may serve as invariants for detecting malicious infrastructure, even as the
attacks themselves evolve.
We draw the following conclusions from our study:
• Malicious Enterprise Customers (ECs) on average change their upstream connectiv-
ity more aggressively than non reported ECs. We offer a new class of observations
on the AS-level re-wiring activity of malicious ECs. ECs are typically stub networks
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(Section 4.2). We find that, on average, malicious ECs change their upstream connec-
tivity more frequently and link with a larger set of providers throughout their lifetime
than non-reported ECs. We observe that malicious ECs link on average with a total
of twelve providers from 1998–2010, whereas the rest of ECs link with only about
four providers on average. Also, malicious ECs’ peering sessions last for less time;
the top 5% of CP links formed by malicious ECs are observed for 14–31 consecutive
snapshots of the AS graph, whereas the top 5% of the CP links formed by the rest of
ECs are observed for 27–51 consecutive snapshots.
• Malicious ECs prefer to attach to popular providers as non reported ECs do when
they first appear, but they attach to less popular providers when they re-wire later in
their lifetime. In 2009–2010, all malicious ECs that were observed for the first time
used the most-preferred providers (the providers that are responsible for the most CP
links generated by non-reported ECs at that snapshot) for transit, as the rest of the
ECs did (Section 4.3). During the same time period, the malicious ECs that were
observed to re-wire, attached to providers from which only a fraction of 30–50%
were among the top providers preferred by non-reported ECs.
Our results highlight some findings that have implications for the design of more ef-
fective defense mechanisms against Internet attacks, which we discuss in more detail in
Section 4.4. Even though an AS may be acting maliciously, network administrators in
other networks may not be aware of it. Instead, if AS rewiring activity is monitored and
potential malfeasance is reported, then this information may be useful to network adminis-
trators. For example, in the case of AS-Atrivo, even if not all network administrators knew
that AS-Atrivo was acting maliciously or the details of the attacks, it may have been help-
ful to know that its re-wiring activity was suspicious, in case they receive suspicious traffic
originating from that AS or if AS-Atrivo tries to connect directly with them. The re-wiring
features are independent of the evolving nature of the attacks and also more difficult for the
attackers to tamper, incorporating them may provide significant gains over existing defense
mechanisms or complement them.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we describe the datasets
we used in our analysis. Section 4.3 presents our findings and Section 4.4 offers some
observations about the implications of our findings with regard to existing defense mecha-
nisms. We conclude in Section 4.5.
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4.2 Data
Our primary dataset consists of a list of networks that are reported as top in Internet criminal
activities, in a period of three years (2009–2011) according to Hostexploit. There are a total
of 129 distinct ASes. We hypothesize that malicious ASes have different business functions
and incentives than most ASes, which may be reflected on the links they form with other
ASes in the Internet. To understand the re-wiring behavior of these networks we obtain a
publicly available dataset of customer-provider links formed among ASes over ten years
(available here [25]), over which we track them. We considerASes that have not ever been
reported by Hostexploit to be legitimate.
Hostexploit reports. To study the behavior of malicious networks that are mostly en-
gaged in Internet nefarious activities, we collected the list of ASes reported as most ma-
licious networks by Hostexploit in global Internet activity reports issued in quarters of
2009–2011. Hostexploit is an open organization of international volunteers who are In-
ternet professionals within the areas of web hosting, server management, DNS, Internet
security, and intrusion detection systems, with a focus on creating awareness of cyber-
crime activity. Hostexploit integrates and correlates data from multiple sources such as
spam, malware, malicious URLs, spam bots, botnet command and control servers, phish-
ing servers, exploit servers, and cyber-warfare intelligence provided by industry partners.
To provide a list of the worst networks, they rate each AS with a Hostexploit Index (HE),
based on the activity of the AS weighted by the size of its allocated address space. HE
is a proportional rather than an absolute index of AS maliciousness. Hostexploit has been
issuing reports on top networks by their HE index periodically since 2009.
Figure 14 shows an example Hostexploit report for the first quarter of 2011. The report
is accompanied by an analysis of the quarterly results. For example, they compare the new
ranking results with the previous quarterly ranking, show the top worst networks by sector
(spam, botnet hosting, etc.), show an analysis by country, etc.
Historic AS relationships. To understand the re-wiring behavior of malicious networks,
we tracked these ASes’ rewiring activity over a ten years. Dhamdhere et al. [25] collected
BGP AS paths from BGP table dumps obtained from repositories at RouteViews and RIPE.
They collected snapshots of AS paths; a snapshot refers to a period of 21 days (not an in-
stant). During each snapshot, they collected at five different times the unique AS paths
from all active monitors. Then, to obtain the primary Internet links (used most of the time)
and to filter out the backup links (used during failures or overload conditions), they kept
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Figure 14: A quarterly report from Hostexploit from the 1st quarter of 2011. The report
ranks ASes by an index (HE) based on the activity of the AS, weighted by the size of its
allocated address space.
only the AS paths that appeared in the majority of the samples and ignored the rest (ma-
jority filtering algorithm). Then, they used the AS paths in each snapshot (those that had
passed the majority filtering process) to infer the underlying AS topology and the relation-
ships between adjacent ASes. Finally, they used the well-known algorithm proposed by
Gao [32]. Gao’s algorithm resulted in four types of AS relationships: Customer-Provider
(CP), peering, sibling, and unknown. To understand the evolution of the Internet ecosys-
tem they classified ASes into types depending on their function and business type, based
on their observable topological properties. They classified ASes into Enterprise Customers
(ECs), small transit provider, large transit provider, content access and hosting provider.
In this study, we focus only on the CP links of ECs (62 in total). We note that based
on the method that the classes were derived, ASes of the same class are close in terms of
the number of customers and peers they link with at each snapshot. As far as the number
of providers they link with at each snapshot there is larger variability among the ASes, but
our analysis is not relying on this metric. Instead, we are looking at the accumulation of
distinct providers across time, the CP link duration and other features (see Section 4.3).
Dataset limitations. Our data has the following limitations: (1) The Hostexploit data
may be inaccurate. (2) The methods that were used to infer the AS graph [25] have been
shown to to be inadequate. Most ASes are detected but a significant fraction of peering and
backup links at the edges of the Internet are missed. (3) Dhamdhere et al.’s AS classifica-






































(b) Distribution of the average Jaccard distance
between two consecutive snapshots of links with
providers.
Figure 15: Malicious ECs on average attach to more providers and change their providers
more frequently than legitimate ECs.
4.3 Results
We hypothesize that malicious ASes have different business functions and incentives than
the rest of the ASes, and that these differences may be reflected on their re-wiring activity.
For example, we suspect that malicious ASes may get frequently de-peered from their
providers and that they need to re-wire more frequently than legitimate ASes. To test our
hypothesis, we survey the wiring trends of malicious networks; (1) re-wiring frequency
and (2) attachment preference. To determine whether our findings may be suitable for
characterizing network re-wiring activity, we compare the behavior of malicious ASes to
that of non-reported ASes over a ten-year period. We present the results of our analysis for
Enterprise Customers (ECs) only.
4.3.1 Re-Wiring Frequency
To understand the re-wiring dynamics of malicious networks and, more specifically, how
these networks change their upstream connectivity, we examine three features; (1) the num-
ber of providers they link with throughout their lifetime, (2) how frequently they change
providers and (3) how long their CP links last. To determine whether these features may be
suitable for characterizing the re-wiring activity of malicious ECs, we compare the behav-
ior of malicious ECs to that of the rest of the ECs over ten years.
Malicious ECs on average connect to more providers than legitimate ECs do. To
investigate how malicious ECs link with their providers we first look at the total number of
providers they link with throughout their lifetime. To compute the cumulative number of
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providers that an EC has, on average, first we track each EC for the duration of its lifetime;
we add the total number of providers it links with to the total number of providers for
its group (malicious or rest of EC). Then, for every snapshot, we compute the average by
dividing the cumulative total number of providers of the EC group with the number of ASes
in the EC class. We note that across time the size of the group increases as new ECs appear,
and as does the cumulative number of providers for the group of EC. The rate with which
the two numbers increase does not stay the same across time, so some snapshots exhibit
a small decrease in the average cumulative number of providers. Figure 15(a) shows the
cumulative number of providers that ECs attach to, on average, for two cases: malicious
ECs and the rest of ECs. On average, malicious ECs link with more providers throughout
their lifetime than the rest of the ECs do.
Malicious ECs link on average with a total of twelve providers during the period 1998–
2010, whereas the rest of ECs link on average with only about four providers. The top
ECs by the total number of providers are AS 3, which connected to 83 distinct providers;
AS 26415, which linked with a total of 68 providers; and the private AS 65000, linked to
20 different providers. On the other hand, the malicious EC that we observed to link with
the most providers (a total of 83) through its lifetime was AS 23456. We note that this
AS is reserved by IANA and is used for backward compatibility between old (2-byte AS
support) and new (4-byte AS support) BGP speakers. Because it is reserved for backwards
compatibility, this AS is likely not a single AS, but rather a group of ASes; we must inves-
tigate this further to better understand the individual ASes that are perpetrating suspicious
activity.
Malicious ECs on average change upstream providers more frequently than legit-
imate ECs. To quantify the aggressiveness of an EC in changing its upstream connectivity,
we consider the distance between the set of the AS’s providers for two consecutive snap-
shots. We use the Jaccard distance as a metric of distance between the set of providers of
two consecutive snapshots. For example, a Jaccard distance of 0.8 indicates that 80% of the
links seen in the two snapshots are observed in one of the two snapshots but not in both. We
calculated the Jaccard distance between two consecutive snapshots for each AS throughout
its lifetime. Figure 15(b) shows the distribution of the Jaccard distance values for malicious
ECs and the rest of the ECs throughout their lifetime. We observe that malicious ECs are
more aggressive on average in changing their upstream connectivity than the rest of ECs.
The fact that malicious ECs change their upstream connectivity more frequently than
legitimate ECs may be a reflection of the following: (1) malicious ECs are noticed by
their providers regarding their attacker activities, they get de-peered and they are forced



















Figure 16: Distribution of the average duration of CP links formed by ECs with their
providers. Malicious ECs on average form shorter duration links than the rest of the ECs.
attempt to find providers with less strict restrictions, which may make it easier for them
to launch their attacks, (3) malicious ECs attempt to avoid accountability or legal conse-
quences of their activities.
Malicious ECs on average form shorter duration CP links than legitimate ECs.
To better understand the behavior of malicious ECs, we consider the duration of the links
they form with their providers. To compute the CP link duration, we proceed as follows:
First, for every snapshot, we determine the links that are present. Second, for each link,
we determine whether it is present in the previous snapshot. Finally, for each link, we
measure the total number of consecutive snapshots it was present. In cases where a link
appears multiple times throughout 1998–2010 we consider the average duration of that
link. Figure 16 shows the distribution of average CP link duration of malicious ECs and
the rest of ECs. We observe that malicious ECs on average form CP links that are shorter
in duration than the CP links that legitimate ECs form.
Figure 16 shows that approximately 22% of the CP links formed by malicious EC and
about 10% of CP links formed by the rest of ECs were observed for only one snapshot.
For example ASes in AS 23456, which linked with the largest number of providers, formed
CP links with ASes 30083, 5617, and 7643, which appeared for only one snapshot. Ex-
amples of short-lived CP links formed by non-malicious ECs include AS 20195–AS 6395,
AS 39709–AS 28870, and AS 3748–AS 4554. These links were observed for only one
snapshot. On the other hand, as far as long-lived CP links, the top 5% of CP links formed
by malicious ECs are observed for 14–31 consecutive snapshots, whereas the top 5% of
the CP links formed by non-malicious ECs are observed for 27–51 consecutive snapshots.














































































Figure 17: Fraction of malicious ASes providers’ that belong to the most preferred
providers of all ECs for each snapshot. Malicious ECs in some cases attach to the most
popular providers when they first appear, but not when they rewire. This is especially true
for the more recent years.
observed for 33 consecutive snapshots, AS 17974–AS 7713 for 31 consecutive snapshots
and AS 13174-AS 1299 for 30 consecutive snapshots. The most long-lived CP links by le-
gitimate ECs were observed for 51 consecutive snapshots (i.e., the entire period from 1998
to 2010); some examples are: AS 8581–AS 5408, AS 2508–AS 2907, AS 7065–AS 701,
AS 10357–AS 7066, and AS 1104–AS 1103.
4.3.2 Attachment Preference
In this section, we study the providers that malicious ECs connect to. Our goal is to de-
termine whether malicious ECs have different attachment preferences than the rest of the
ECs. We define the most preferred providers as the providers that are responsible for the
most CP links generated by non-reported ECs at that snapshot. We find that malicious ECs
do not connect to the most preferred providers as non-reported ECs do.
First, at each snapshot, we determine the most preferred providers as follows: we cal-
culate the total number of CP links generated by non-reported ECs at each snapshot and we
extract the providers that are responsible for at least 60% of the total at that snapshot. This
set comprises the most preferred providers of non-reported ECs at each snapshot. Second,
for each snapshot, we determine the providers that malicious ECs link with and whether
those links are first-time attachments or re-wirings. Finally, at each snapshot, we calculate
the fraction of the providers that malicious ECs link with that also belong to the most pre-
ferred providers of non-reported ECs. We calculate this fraction separately for the cases
of first-attachment (when an EC is observed for the first time) and re-wiring (when an EC
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re-wires).
Figure 17 shows the fractions of the providers of malicious ECs that belong to the
most preferred providers of non-reported ECs, for the cases of first attachment and re-
wiring across time. We observe that for the case of first attachment, all or almost all of the
providers they link with are also among the most preferred providers of non-reported ECs.
In contrast, for the case of re-wiring, only a percentage of the providers that malicious ECs
link with are also among the most preferred providers of non-reported ECs. We observe
that for the years 2009–2010, approximately 30–50% of the providers that malicious ECs
link with are also among the most preferred providers of non-reported ECs.
4.4 Recommendations and Future Work
Although we have focused on characterization of re-wiring activity, we believe that routing
behavior associated with malicious networks has properties that can lead to both better
protection against Internet attacks and more efficient detection of the networks that host the
attackers. Specifically, because it is independent of any particular attack, routing behavior
may serve as invariant behavior that can help identify networks that perpetrate a wider
variety of attacks. Routing data is also publicly available and can complement other types
of detection mechanisms. In the remainder of this section, first we discuss various lessons
from this characterization study that may ultimately inform detection methods and second
we discuss future work.
We first note that networks that consistently host malicious activity have re-wiring be-
haviors that are distinct from other networks. This may point to possibilities for stemming
the tide of attack traffic in the future. In the past, we have seen dramatic de-peering events
of a single AS (e.g., Atrivo/Intercage), which have resulted in a precipitous drop in spam
traffic, which returned at a later date, likely as the spammers re-established upstream con-
nectivity with other upstream ASes. Our analysis shows that the stub ASes that tend to
originate a significant amount of attack traffic tend to re-wire with upstream ASes that are
not “preferred” upstream ASes. In the future, more effective AS reputation systems might
incorporate information not only about the AS itself that originates the traffic, but also the
upstream ASes to which the network connects. Given the aggressive re-wiring in which ma-
licious ASes participate, another possible way forward might be to encourage some type of
registration or verification process by which an AS (or its upstream) is vetted as a reputable
provider.
In future work, we plan to evaluate (1) the possibility to classify malicious ASes using
re-wiring activity features we observed in this study and (2) the efficacy of using routing
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information as input to an AS reputation system. We also plan to investigate the re-wiring
activity of malicious ASes by class (e.g., small transit providers, large transit providers and
content providers) and also by the type of attack they appear to be engaged with (e.g., some
malicious ASes may appear mostly to send spam during a specific period of time whereas
other ASes may appear to be hosting command-and-control infrastructure). It remains to be
seen whether a blacklisting system that is based on re-wiring behavior would be sufficiently
different than one that uses observations of the attacks themselves as input.
4.5 Conclusion
Although limited empirical studies have suggested that attackers exploit BGP routing to
help cloak their attacks, there has been no detailed longitudinal study of how malicious
networks may interconnect differently from other ASes. In this chapter, we have analyzed
more than ten years of BGP data in conjunction with reports of malicious ASes from Hos-
texploit and found that ASes that are known to host malicious traffic consistently exhibit
different re-wiring behavior than other ASes. We believe that our findings may ultimately
serve as useful features for other reputation or attack detection mechanisms. The fact that
routing dynamics are a property of the network hosting the attack, rather than of any spe-
cific attack, may ultimately prove advantageous in this regard. In particular, using BGP




ASWATCH: AN AS REPUTATION SYSTEM TO EXPOSE
BULLETPROOF HOSTING ASES
5.1 Introduction
Today’s cyber-criminals must carefully manage their network resources to evade detection
and maintain profitable illicit businesses. For example, botmasters need to protect their
botnet command-and-control (C&C) servers from takedowns, spammers need to rotate IP
addresses to evade trivial blacklisting, and rogue online businesses need to set up proxies
to mask scam hosting servers. Often, cyber-criminals accomplish these goals by hosting
their services within a malicious autonomous system (AS) owned by an Internet service
provider that willingly hosts and protects illicit activities. Such service providers are usu-
ally referred to as bulletproof hosting [16], due to their reluctance to address repeated abuse
complaints regarding their customers and the illegal services they run. Notorious cases of
malicious ASes include McColo [54], Intercage [47], Troyak [68], and Vline [2] (these
ASes were taken down by law enforcement between 2008 and 2011). According to Host-
exploit’s reports [35], these types of ASes continue to appear in many regions around the
world—mostly in smaller countries with lower levels of regulation, but also in the United
States—to support activities ranging from hosting botnet command-and-control to phishing
attacks [36]. For example, the Russian Business Network [83], one of the most notorious
and still active cybercrime organizations, have decentralized their operations across multi-
ple ASes. In most cases, nobody notices bulletproof hosting ASes until they have become
hubs of illegal activities, at which point they are de-peered from their upstream providers.
For example, Intercage [47] was de-peered more than ten times before it reached notoriety
and was cut off from all upstream providers.
To defend against these crime-friendly ASes, the community has developed several
AS reputation systems that monitor data-plane traffic for illicit activities. Existing AS
reputation systems typically monitor network traffic from different vantage points to detect
the presence of either malware-infected machines that contact their C&C servers, send
spam, host phishing or scam websites, or perform other illicit activities. These systems
establish AS reputation by measuring the “density” of malicious network activities hosted
within an AS. For instance, FIRE [101] tracks the number of botnet C&C and drive-by
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malware download servers within an AS. ASes that host a large concentration of malware-
related servers are then assigned a low reputation. Similarly, Hostexploit [35] and BGP
Ranking [12] compute the reputation of an AS based on data collected from sources such
as DShield [26] and a variety of IP and domain name blacklists.
Unfortunately, these existing AS reputation systems have a number of limitations:
(1) They cannot distinguish between malicious and legitimate but abused ASes. Legitimate
ASes often unwillingly host malicious network activities (e.g., C&C servers, phishing sites)
simply because the machines that they host are abused. For example, AS 26496 (GoDaddy)
and AS 15169 (Google) repeatedly appeared for years among the ASes with lowest reputa-
tion, as reported by Hostexploit. Although these ASes are legitimate and typically respond
to abuse complaints with corrective actions, they may simply be unable to keep pace with
the level of abuse within their network. On the other hand, malicious ASes are typically
unresponsive to security complaints and subject to law-enforcement takedown. (2) Because
of the inability to distinguish between malicious and legitimate but abused ASes, it is not
clear how to use the existing AS rankings to defend against malicious ASes. (3) Existing
AS reputation systems require direct observation of malicious activity from many different
vantage points and for an extended period of time, thus delaying detection.
We present a fundamentally different approach to establishing AS reputation. We de-
sign a system, ASwatch, that aims to identify malicious ASes using exclusively control-
plane data (i.e., the BGP routing control messages exchanged between ASes using BGP).
Unlike existing data-plane based reputation systems, ASwatch explicitly aims to identify
malicious ASes, rather than assigning low reputation to legitimate ASes that have unfortu-
nately been abused.
Our work is motivated by the practical help that an AS reputation system, which ac-
curately identifies malicious ASes, may offer: (1) Network administrators may handle
traffic appropriately from ASes that are likely operated by cyber criminals. (2) Upstream
providers may use reliable AS reputation in the peering decision process (e.g. charge higher
a low reputation customer, or even de-peer early). (3) Law enforcement practitioners may
prioritize their investigations and start early monitoring on ASes, which will likely need
remediation steps.
The main intuition behind ASwatch is that malicious ASes may manipulate the Internet
routing system, in ways that legitimate ASes do not, in an attempt to evade current detection
and remediation efforts. For example, malicious ASes “rewire” with one another, forming
groups of ASes, often for a relatively short period of time [49]. Only one AS from the group
connects to a legitimate upstream provider, to ensure connectivity and protection for the
group. Alternatively, they may connect directly to a legitimate upstream provider, in which
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case they may need to change upstream providers frequently, to avoid being de-peered and
isolated from the rest of the internet. Changing providers is necessary because a legitimate
upstream provider typically responds (albeit often slowly) to repeated abuse complaints
concerning its customer ASes. Another example is that a malicious AS may advertise and
use small blocks of its IP address space, so that as soon as one small block of IP addresses
is blocked or blacklisted, a new block can be advertised and used to support malicious
activities. To capture this intuition, we derive a collection of control-plane features that is
evident solely from BGP traffic observed via Routeviews [86]. We then incorporate these
features into a supervised learning algorithm, that automatically distinguishes malicious
ASes from legitimate ones.
We offer the following contributions:
• We present ASwatch, an AS reputation system that aims to identify malicious ASes
by monitoring their control plane behavior.
• We identify three families of features that aim to capture different aspects of the
“agile” control plane behavior typical of malicious ASes. (1) AS rewiring captures
aggressive changes in AS connectivity; (2) BGP routing dynamics capture routing
behavior that may reflect criminal illicit operations; and (3) Fragmentation and churn
of the advertised IP address space capture the partition and rotation of the advertised
IP address space.
• We evaluate ASwatch on real cases of malicious ASes. We collect ground truth infor-
mation about numerous malicious and legitimate ASes, and we show that ASwatch
can achieve high true positive rates with reasonably low false positives. We evaluate
our statistical features and find that the rewiring features are the most important.
• We compare the performance of ASwatch with BGP Ranking, a state-of-the-art AS
reputation system that relies on data-plane information. Our analysis over nearly
three years shows that ASwatch detects about 72% of the malicious ASes that were
observable over this time period, whereas BGP Ranking detects only about 34%.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 offers background informa-
tion about bulletproof hosting ASes. Section 5.3 describes the features we devised and an
overview of our system. Section 5.4 discusses the evaluation of the system. Section 5.5
discusses various limitations of our work and Section 5.6 concludes.
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5.2 Background
In this section, we describe more precisely the differences between malicious (bulletproof
hosting) and legitimate ASes. We provide background information, with an emphasis on
characteristics that are common across most confirmed cases of malicious ASes. We also
discuss how malicious ASes tend to connect with one another, and how some ISPs (some of
which are themselves malicious) provide these ASes with upstream connectivity and pro-
tection. To illustrate this behavior, we explore a case study that shows how malicious ASes
may be established and “rewired” in an attempt to evade current detection and takedown
efforts.
Malicious vs. Legitimate ASes: We call an AS malicious, if it is managed and oper-
ated by cyber-criminals, and if its main purpose is to support illicit network activities (e.g.,
phishing, malware distribution, botnets). In contrast, we refer to an AS as legitimate, if its
main purpose is to provide legitimate Internet services. In some cases, a legitimate AS’s IP
address space may be abused by cyber-criminals to host malicious activities (e.g., sending
spam, hosting a botnet command-and-control server). Such abuse is distinct from those
cases where cyber-criminals operate and manage the AS. ASwatch focuses on distinguish-
ing between malicious and legitimate ASes; we aim to label legitimate but abused ASes
as legitimate. Our approach is thus a significant departure from existing data-plane based
AS reputation systems, which are limited to computing reputation by primarily focusing
on data-plane abuse, rather than establishing if an AS is actually malicious.
Malicious AS Relationships: Bulletproof hosting ASes provide cyber-criminals with a
safe environment to operate. Sometimes, malicious ASes form business relationships with
one another to ensure upstream connectivity and protection. For example, they may con-
nect to upstream providers that are themselves operated in part with criminal intent. In turn,
these upstream ASes connect to legitimate ISPs, effectively providing cover for the bullet-
proof hosting ASes [2]. These “masking” upstream providers may not be actively engaged
in cyber-criminal activity themselves (as observed from the data-plane). Consequently, net-
work operators at legitimate ISPs may be unaware of the partnership among these “shady”
upstream providers and bulletproof hosting ASes, making detection and remediation efforts
more difficult.
Efforts to take down bulletproof hosting ASes have been ongoing since at least 2007,
when upstream ISPs of the Russian Business Network (RBN) refused to route its traf-





















































Figure 18: The AS-TROYAK infrastructure (malicious ASes identified by blogs.rsa.
com). The core of the infrastructure comprises eight bulletproof networks, which connect
to legitimate ASes via a set of intermediate ”masking” providers.
ASes every year [36]. Takedown efforts often result in a malicious AS moving to new
upstream ISPs; for example, RBN now operates on many different ISP networks.
Case Study - Behavior of Malicious ASes: Figure 18 shows an example of a real net-
work of eight bulletproof hosting ASes that connect to legitimate ASes via a set of inter-
mediate “masking” providers. Notice that while we label the malicious ASes in this case
study, based on ground truth provided by blogs.rsa.com, we independently derive and
analyze the relationships between the ASes from routing information. At the time they
were reported by blogs.rsa.com (March 2010), the eight bulletproof ASes hosted a
range of malware, including Zeus Trojans, RockPhish JabberZeus servers, and Gozi Trojan
servers. We chose this as a case study because it represents one of the most well docu-
mented cases of known bulletproof hosting ASes, and is representative of other less well
known incidents.















































































































(c) Troyak (AS 50215), 2010.02.01-2010.04.01
Figure 19: Connectivity snapshots of three cases of ASes which are operated by cyber-
criminals. All connected to a “masking” upstream provider. Directed edges represent
customer-provider relationships; undirected edges represent peering relationships.
as intermediaries to connect to the legitimate ASes. In turn, the upstream “masking”











































Figure 20: ASwatch system architecture.
To understand how malicious ASes form business relationships and how these rela-
tionships evolve over time, we tracked the upstream and downstream connectivity of the
malicious ASes, as shown in Figures 18 and 19 (the figures show an activity period from
January to April 2010; the malicious ASes went offline in March 2010).
We tracked the connectivity of one “masking” AS, Troyak (AS 50215), and two bul-
letproof hosting ASes, Bogonet (AS 47821) and Prombuddetal (AS 44107), that belong to
the Troyak infrastructure. To track their upstream and downstream connectivity, we used a
publicly available dataset from CAIDA, which provides snapshots of the AS graph, anno-
tated with business relationships [65]. Figure 19 shows snapshots of the connectivity for
the reported ASes.
All of these malicious ASes connected to a “masking” upstream provider, thus avoiding
direct connectivity with legitimate ISPs, and also they change their connectivity between
one another. For example, before takedown, Troyak had three upstream providers: Root,
Ihome, and Oversun-Mercury. After the blog report on March 2010, Troyak lost all of
its upstream providers and relied on a peering relationship with Ya for connectivity. Af-
ter April 2010, Troyak and its customers went offline. Bogonet switched from Taba to
Smallshop, and Prombuddetal switched from Profitlan to Smallshop, before going offline.
5.3 ASwatch
ASwatch monitors globally visible BGP routing activity and AS relationships, to determine
which ASes exhibit control plane behavior typical of malicious ASes. Because of the na-
ture of their operations (criminal activity) and their need to fend off detection and possible
take-down efforts, malicious ASes tend to exhibit control-plane behavior that is different
from that of legitimate ASes. We now discuss how ASwatch works, including a detailed
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description of the features we used to differentiate between malicious and legitimate ASes,
and our intuition for choosing each feature.
5.3.1 System Overview
Figure 20 presents an overview of ASwatch. The system has a training phase (Section 5.3.3.1)
and an operational phase (Section 5.3.3.2). During the training phase, ASwatch learns the
control-plane behavior of malicious and legitimate ASes. We provide the system with ¬ a
list of known malicious and legitimate ASes (Section 5.4.1 describes this dataset). ASwatch
tracks the control-plane behavior of the legitimate and malicious ASes over time using two
sources of information: ­ business relationships between ASes, and ® BGP updates (from
RouteViews). ASwatch then computes statistical features (Section 5.3.2 describes this pro-
cess) from the previous inputs. Each AS is represented by a feature vector based on these
statistical features ¯. ASwatch uses these labeled feature vectors and a supervised learning
algorithm to ° train a statistical model. During the operational phase, we provide ASwatch
with a list of new (not yet labeled) ASes ± to be classified as legitimate or malicious using
the same statistical features over the given time period. Then, ASwatch ² computes the
new AS feature vectors and ° tests them against the previously trained statistical model.
Finally, ³ the system assigns a reputation score to each AS.
5.3.2 Statistical Features
In this section, we describe the features we compute and the intuition for choosing them.
Table 12 gives an overview of our feature families, and the most important group of fea-
tures for each family. Given an AS,A, and time window, T , ASwatch monitorsA’s control-
plane behavior and translates it into a feature vector consisting of three groups of features:
rewiring activity, IP fragmentation and churn, and BGP routing dynamics.
Some of the behavioral characteristics we measure can be naturally described by a
probability distribution, rather than a single numerical feature. In these cases, to capture
the behavioral characteristics in a way that is more suitable for input to a statistical clas-
sifier, we translate each probability distribution into three numerical features that approx-
imately describe the shape of the distribution. Specifically, we compute its 5th percentile,
95th percentile, and median. In the following, we refer to such features as distribution
characteristics. We include these three values as features in the overall feature vector, and
repeat this process for all behavioral characteristics that can be described as a probability
distribution.
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Notice that even though more values may more accurately summarize a distribution’s
shape, such a representation would significantly increase the overall size of the feature
vector used to describe an AS. For this reason, we chose to only use three representative
values, which we found to work well in practice.
We now explain in detail the features that ASwatch uses to establish AS reputation and
motivate how we selected them.
5.3.2.1 Rewiring Activity
This group of features aims to capture the changes in A’s connectivity. Our intuition is that
malicious ASes have different connectivity behavior than legitimate ASes, because they
tend to: (1) change providers more frequently to make detection and remediation more
difficult; (2) connect with less popular providers, which may have less strict security pro-
cedures and may respond less promptly to abuse complaints, (3) have longer periods of
downtime, possibly due to short-duration contracts or even de-peering from a legitimate
upstream provider. In contrast, legitimate ASes tend to change their connectivity less fre-
quently, typically due to business considerations (e.g., a less expensive contract with a new
provider).
To capture rewiring activity, ASwatch tracks changes to AS relationships (Step 2 in
Figure 20). We use periodic snapshots of historic AS relationships, with one snapshot per
month (Section 5.4.1 describes the data sets in more detail). A snapshot Si contains the
AS links annotated with the type of relationships, as observed at a given time ti (e.g., one
snapshot is produced on the first day of each month).
AS presence and overall activity. Let A be the AS for which we want to compute our
features. Given a sequence of N consecutive snapshots {Si}Ni=1, we capture the presence
of an AS by measuring the total number of snapshots, C, and the maximum number of
contiguous snapshots, M , in which A was present, the fraction C/N , and M/N (four
features in total). To capture the overall activity of A, we measure the distribution (over
time) of the number of customers, providers, and peers A links with for each snapshot.
To summarize each of these distributions, we extract the distribution characteristics (5th
percentile, 95th percentile, and median), as described earlier. This yields a total of nine
features (three for each of the three types of AS relationships). We also count the total
number and fraction (i.e., normalized by C) of distinct customers, providers, and peers that
A has linked with across all C snapshots when it was present, yielding another six features.
Link stability. We capture the stability of different types of relationships that an AS forms
over time. For each of the C snapshots where A was present, we track all relationships
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between A and any other AS. Assuming A appeared as an upstream provider for another
AS, say Ak, in v out of C snapshots, we compute the fraction F k = v/C. We repeat
this for all ASes where A appears as a provider at least once within C snapshots, thus
obtaining a distribution of the F k values. Finally, we summarize this distribution of the
F k values, computing the distribution characteristics as described above. We repeat this
process, considering all ASes that appear as the upstream provider for A (i.e., A is their
customer), and for all ASes that have peering relationships with A. Overall, we compute
nine features that summarize three different distributions (three features for each type of
relationship).
Upstream connectivity. We attempt to capture change in the set of providers. Assume
that from the i-th snapshot Si we observed a total of Mi upstream providers for A, and call
{Aki }
Mi
k=1 the set of upstream provider ASes. Then, for each pair of contiguous snapshots,
Si and Si+1, we measure the Jaccard similarity coefficient Ji,i+1 between the sets {Aki } and
{Aki+1}. We repeat for all available (N−1) pairs of consecutive snapshots, thus obtaining a
distribution of Jaccard similarity coefficients. To summarize this distribution, we compute
the distribution characteristics as described above, yielding three features. Figure 21 shows
the CDF of the minimum Jaccard similarity, for the malicious and the legitimate ASes.
Overall, the legitimate ASes tend to have higher values of the Jaccard similarity metric,
which indicates fewer changes in their upstream providers.
Attachment to popular providers. We aim to capture an AS’s preference for “popular”
providers. As previous work has shown [49], malicious ASes tend to connect more often
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with less prominent providers, which may have less strict security procedures and may
respond less promptly to abuse complaints.
We compute the popularity of each provider per snapshot and across all snapshots.
To this end, we first empirically derive the distribution of the number of customers per
provider. We then consider a provider to be (a) very popular, if it belongs to the top 1% of
all providers overall; (b) popular, if it belongs to the top 5%; (c) very popular with respect
to a snapshot Si, if it belongs to the top 1% in Si, and (d) popular with respect to a snapshot
Si, if it belongs to the top 5% in Si.
We then gather all upstream providers that A has used and compute the fraction of
these providers that fall into each of the four categories described above (thus yielding four
features). Finally, we compute the fraction of snapshots in which A has linked to at least
one provider falling into one of the above categories; we do this for each category, thus
obtaining four more features.
We capture the overall rewiring behavior of an AS with a total number of thirty five
features.
5.3.2.2 IP Space Fragmentation and Churn
Malicious ASes tend to partition their IP address space into small BGP prefixes and to
advertise only some of these prefixes at any given time. One possible explanation for this
behavior may be that they attempt to avoid having their entire IP address space blacklisted
at once. For example, if a number of IP addresses within a given BGP prefix are detected
as hosting malicious activities, a blacklist operator (e.g., Spamhaus [96]) may decide to
blacklist the entire prefix where the IP addresses reside. By fragmenting the IP address
space and advertising only a subset of their BGP prefixes, the operators of a malicious AS
may be able to quickly move malicious activities to a “fresh” space. They perform this
maneuver by leveraging not-yet-blacklisted IP addresses within newly advertised prefixes.
On the other hand, legitimate ASes tend to consistently advertise their available IP address
space in less fragmented prefixes, as they do not need to attempt to evade blacklisting.
IP Space Fragmentation and Churn Features. We attempt to capture IP address frag-
mentation with the following features. Given a snapshot, we group the advertised BGP
prefixes into contiguous IP blocks. For each, AS we count the number of BGP prefixes
and the number of distinct /8, /16, and /24 prefixes within each IP block. To capture
the churn in the advertisement of the IP address space, we proceed as follows. Given a
pair of adjacent snapshots for an AS, we measure the Jaccard similarity among the sets of
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Figure 21: Malicious ASes rewire more frequently. Distribution of the 5th percentile
of the Jaccard similarity coefficient between consecutive snapshots of an AS’s upstream
providers. Higher values indicate fewer changes in upstream connectivity.



















Figure 22: Malicious ASes withdraw prefixes for longer periods. The distribution of
the median interval between a prefix withdrawal and re-announcement across 15 contigu-
ous epochs.
BGP prefixes advertised by the AS in the two snapshots. Similarly, we compute the Jac-
card index among the sets of /8, /16, and /24 prefixes. We summarize the above four
distributions using the distribution characteristics that we described earlier, thus obtaining
a total of twelve features.
5.3.2.3 BGP Routing Dynamics
These features attempt to capture abnormal BGP announcement and withdrawal patterns.
For example, to support aggressive IP address space fragmentation and churn and avoid
easy blacklisting, malicious ASes may periodically announce certain prefixes for short pe-
riods of time. On the contrary, the pattern of BGP announcements and withdrawals for
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legitimate ASes is mainly driven by normal network operations (e.g., traffic load balanc-
ing, local policy changes), and should thus exhibit BGP routing dynamics that are different
to those of malicious ASes.
Prefix reachability. We aim to capture the fraction of time that prefixes advertised by
A remain reachable, which we define as reachability. First, we measure the time that
elapses between an announcement and a withdrawal for every advertised prefix. Given the
distribution of these time intervals, we extract the distribution characteristics as described
above. Second, we track the time for a prefix to become reachable again after a withdrawal.
Third, we measure the inter-arrival time (IAT) between withdrawals, for each of the prefixes
that A announces, and compute the IAT distribution. As before, we extract the distribution
characteristics for each of the three distributions, yielding a total of nine features. Figure
22 shows the CDF of the median reachability value for the malicious and the legitimate
ASes over the course of one day, and over 15 days. Higher values of this feature suggest
that malicious ASes tend to re-advertise their prefixes after longer delays.
Topology and policy changes. We track the topology and policy changes, defined as in
Li et al. [63], that are associated with each prefix. We define a policy change as follows:
after a path to a destination is announced, a second BGP announcement is observed with
the same AS path and next-hop, yet one or more of the other attributes (such as MED or
community) is different. Similarly, we define a topology change event as follows: after a
path to a destination is announced, a second announcement follows with an alternate route
(implicit withdrawal) or after a route to a destination is explicitly withdrawn, a different
route (with different AS path or next-hop attributes) to the same destination is announced
(explicit withdrawal).
To capture and summarize the topology and policy changes per AS, we group the pre-
fixes per origin AS (the origin AS appears as the last AS in the AS path). We track the
policy change events for each prefix, and we measure the inter-arrival time between the
events per prefix. Then, we analyze the collection of inter-arrival times of the policy events
for all prefixes advertised by the same AS. For each AS, we form the distribution of such
intervals, and we extract the distribution characteristics as described above. We also com-
pute the total number of events and the total number of events divided by the total prefixes
advertised by the AS. We repeat this process for the topology change events. We compute
a total of ten features.
5.3.3 System Operation
We now describe ASwatch’s training and operation.
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5.3.3.1 Training Phase
To train the classifier (Steps 6 and 7 in Figure 20), we first prepare a training dataset with
labeled feature vectors related to known malicious and legitimate ASes. We start with a
ground truth dataset that includes confirmed cases of malicious ASes, and legitimate ASes
(described in more details is Section 5.4.1).
We compute the statistical features for each labeled AS using two sources of data: BGP
announcements and withdrawals from Routeviews [86], and information from a publicly
available dataset [65] about the relationships between ASes. We compute the feature
vectors over m contiguous epochs (in our experiments, each epoch is one day). More
specifically, we maintain a sliding window of size m epochs, which advances one epoch
at a time. Using this sliding window, we can compute multiple feature vectors for each
AS (one per window). Then, we associate a label to each feature vector, according to the
ground truth related to the AS from which a vector was computed.
Finally, to build the statistical classifier, we use the Random Forest (RF) algorithm.
We experimented with different algorithms, but we chose RF because it can be trained
efficiently and has been shown to perform competitively with respect to other algorithms
for a variety of problems [15].
5.3.3.2 Operational Phase
Once the statistical classifier has been trained, ASwatch can assign a reputation score to new
ASes (i.e., ASes for which no ground truth is yet available). ASwatch computes a reputation
score for each new AS observed in the BGP messages from Routeviews. Suppose that
we want to compute the reputation of an AS, A, over some time period, T . First, we
compute A’s features (as explained in Section 5.3.2) over period T , using a sliding window
procedure as in the training phase. Namely, a feature vector is computed for each window
within T . Second, we classify an AS as malicious, if ASwatch consistently assigns it a low
reputation score for several days in a row.
More specifically, let Ti be the current day of observations, fA,Ti be the corresponding
feature vector for A, and s(fA,Ti) be the bad reputation score output by the classifier at the
end of Ti. Also let Wi = (Ti, Ti+1, . . . , T(i+m−1)) be a period of m consecutive days. We
report A as malicious if: (a) score s(fA,Ti) > θ for 90% of the days in period Wi, where θ
is a predefined threshold that can be learned during the training period; and (b) condition
(a) holds for at least l consecutive periods Wi,Wi+1, . . . ,Wi+l.
We note that we have experimented with multiple values for m and l (see Section 5.4.3
for detailed discussion on parameter selection).
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5.4 Evaluation
We now describe the data we collected and the setup for our evaluation of ASwatch, where
we evaluate the system’s accuracy. Our results show that ASwatch achieves a high detection
rate for a reasonably low false positive rate, can detect malicious ASes before they are
publicly reported by others, and can complement existing AS reputation systems that rely
solely on data-plane observations. Furthermore, we find that ASwatch detects nearly double
the fraction of confirmed cases of malicious ASes compared to BGP Ranking, a data-plane
based AS reputation system.
5.4.1 Data
Labeling malicious ASes. Collecting reliable ground truth about malicious ASes is ex-
tremely challenging, due to the utter lack of public information available about such cases.
Nonetheless, through extensive manual search and review efforts, we managed to collect a
set of ASes for which there exists publicly available evidence of malicious behavior. For
example, we identified a reasonable set of malicious ASes that were at some point seized
by law enforcement or disconnected by other network operators.
To obtain our dataset of malicious ASes, we searched through websites that are operated
by cyber-security professionals (e.g., www.abuse.ch, blogs.rsa.com [1,2,21,34,37,
55]) and carefully reviewed articles about ASes known to be operated by cyber-criminals.
We observed the following common characteristics across all articles and blog reports
we considered: (1) the reported ASes hosted a variety of cyber-criminal activities (e.g.,
botnet C&C hosting, malware domains, phishing), (2) several ASes were associated with
each other, either directly (e.g., customer-provider relationship) or indirectly (e.g., they
shared the same upstream provider), (3) the operators of these ASes were uncooperative
and unresponsive (e.g., would not respond to abuse complaints or attempts by other AS
operators to communicate with them), (4) some ASes were prosecuted by law enforcement
and taken down, (5) many of these disappeared only for a relatively short time before
resurfacing. From each blog report, we extracted the ASes involved and the dates when
they were active. Overall, we collected forty one known malicious ASes. We provide our
list of ASes in Figure 23.
Labeling legitimate ASes. To collect a set of legitimate ASes, we proceeded as fol-
lows. Every day for one year, we collected the list of top one million domain names from
alexa.com. For each of these domains, we calculated the average daily ranking; we









Ys-IX, AS31506  
Vakushan, AS34229  
Euroaccess, AS34305  
SunNetwork, AS38197  
Vline, AS39150 
Realhosts, AS39458  
UninetMd, AS39858   
Infium, AS40965  
Egis, AS40989  
K2KContel, AS43181  
Phorm, AS48214  
IT-Outsource, AS48280  
Vlaf, AS48984  
Moviement, AS49073  
Interactive-3D, AS49544  
Vvpn, AS49934  
Softnet, AS50073 
Onlinenet, AS50722  
Digernet, AS50818  
Proxiez, AS50896  
Gorby, AS51303  
Vpnme, AS51354  
Lyahov, AS51554  
Taba, AS8287  
Retn, AS9002   
Vesteh, AS47560  
Prombuddetal, AS44107  
Citygame, AS12604  
Bogonet, AS47821  
Troyak, AS50215  
Vishclub, AS50369  
Gaxtranz/Info, AS29371   
Group3, AS50033  
Smila, AS50390  
 
Figure 23: Malicious ASes we collected from blogs.
selected only those domains that were consistently very popular. Finally, we mapped each
domain name to its resolved IP addresses and mapped those IP addresses to the AS that
hosted them. Overall, we collected a total of 389 ASes, which we label as legitimate.
Although we cannot be absolutely certain that our labeling of legitimate ASes contains
no noise, we rely on two reasonable assumptions. First, we assume that websites that are
consistently popular are unlikely to be offering malicious services. Intuitively, a malicious
site that becomes highly popular would also have a high number of victims, and would
rapidly attract attention for take-down. As a result, the site would be quickly blocked
or taken down and would thus not remain consistently popular. Second, we assume that
the administrators of the most popular websites are unlikely to host their services within
malicious ASes. Intuitively, if they relied on malicious ASes, they would risk damaging
their own reputation, not to mention extended downtimes if the hosting ASes were taken
down due to abuse complaints.
Finally, to ensure that our set of legitimate ASes consists of ASes that are similar in
size to the malicious ASes, we keep only those legitimate ASes that have no customers, or
whose customers are all stub ASes.
AS rewiring and relationships data (CAIDA). To track how malicious ASes change
their connectivity, we use a publicly available dataset that reports AS business relationships.
The dataset reports one snapshot of the AS graph per month, from 1998 to 2013.
Luckie et al. [65] provide an AS graph built by inferring business relationships among
ASes, based on AS customer cones. Although this dataset has its own limitations (see
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Section 5.5), it provides a reasonably accurate view of AS relationships, allowing us to
estimate our rewiring features that we presented in Section 5.3.2.
BGP routing dynamics (Routeviews). To further capture the control-plane behavior of
malicious and legitimate ASes, we monitored the BGP messages that originate from these
ASes using the Routeviews dataset. We use this dataset to measure both the dynamics of
BGP updates and the IP fragmentation and churn features.
5.4.2 Experiment Setup
In the following section, we describe the training and the evaluation of our system. The
training period extends from January 2010 to March 2010, while the evaluation experiments
extend from January 2011 to December 2013.
Computing AS feature vectors. Given a period of time (i.e., m contiguous epochs) over
which we want to capture the behavior of an AS, we construct the AS feature vector as
follows: (1) Rewiring activity: We compute the rewiring features over the most recent k
snapshots of the AS relationships dataset, prior to the period of interest. Our source of
AS relationships provides only one snapshot per month. Given this limitation, we select a
reasonable number of snapshots to capture the most recent rewiring activity of an AS. For
our experiments we set k = 4 (see Section 5.4.3 on parameter selection); (2) BGP routing
activity: To compute BGP routing dynamics features, IP address space fragmentation and
churn, we collect the BGP announcements and withdrawals originating from the AS during
the period of interest. We note that BGP Routeviews offers a large number of monitors. Our
pilot experiments over a number of different monitors indicated that changing the monitor
selection did not significantly affect the overall performance of our classifier. Therefore,
to compute our routing activity features, we select one monitor and consistently use it,
throughout all the experiments.
Training the AS reputation model. Because our data is derived from cases of malicious
ASes publicly reported by others, we rely on the report dates for an approximate period of
time when the ASes were likely to be actively used by the attackers. For example, if an AS
was reported as malicious on a given day d, we assume the AS was operated by criminals
for at least a few months before d (in fact, it typically takes time for security operators
to detect, track, confirm, and take down a malicious AS). For the purpose of computing
our labeled feature vectors and training our system, we selected a period of time with the
highest concentration of active malicious ASes. This period extends from January–March
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2010, during which we identified a total of 15 active malicious ASes. Even though this
period may appear somewhat dated, it allows us to capture the agile behavior of several
known malicious ASes within one consistent time frame, enabling a “clean” evaluation
setup. Our evaluation detects a large fraction of malicious ASes that we have observed
over a longer, more recent time period (2011–2013). In the future, we plan to investigate
more sources of ground truth and identify additional periods of time that can be used to
train our model (see Section 5.5 for further discussion).
Performing cross-validation tests. During the three-month training period mentioned
above, we maintain a sliding window of fifteen contiguous days (epochs), sliding the win-
dow one day at a time (i.e., two consecutive windows overlap by 14 days). For each sliding
window, we compute the feature vector for each AS and we perform three-fold cross-
validation as follows: (1) We separate the ASes into three subsets, using two subsets to
train our reputation model, and one for testing. (2) For each training subset, we balance the
two classes by oversampling from the underrepresented class. After balancing, the number
of feature vectors of the two classes are equal. (3) We train the model using a Random For-
est classifier [15]. (4) Finally, we test all feature vectors that belong to the third fold against
the model, as we described in Section 5.3.3. Cross-validation yields the scores from the
testing phase and the true label for each AS feature vector. We plot the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC), which illustrates the performance of the classifier for different values
of the detection threshold. Because we perform our testing once for each sliding window,
we plot a similar ROC for each sliding window. The results are reported in Section 5.4.3.
Evaluating ASwatch across a nearly three-year period. After the cross-validation ex-
periments, we use our model to test new ASes whose BGP behavior was observed outside
the training period over nearly three years, from 2011 to 2013. We perform this evalua-
tion for two reasons: a) to test how well ASwatch performs to detect new malicious ASes
(outside of the training period), and b) to compare the performance of ASwatch with other
AS reputation systems (e.g., BGP Ranking) over an extended period of time. For each
(previously unseen) AS we want to test against ASwatch, we classify it as malicious if it
has multiple feature vectors that are consistently assigned a “bad reputation” score (see
Section 5.3.3). The results are reported in Section 5.4.3.
5.4.3 Results
How accurate is ASwatch? Evaluation with cross-validation: Figure 24 shows the
detection and false positive rates for one cross-validation run. The detection rate and false
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Figure 24: The cross-validation detection and false positive rates of ASwatch.
positives reported on the ROC correspond to the fraction of malicious feature vectors that
are correctly classified and legitimate feature vectors that are incorrectly classified, respec-
tively. As shown by the ROC curve, ASwatch can achieve a detection rate of 93.33% (cor-
rectly classifying 14 out of 15 ASes as malicious), with a reasonably low false positive rate
of 5.25% (20 falsely detected ASes). In practice, we believe this false positive rate is man-
ageable, as it represents 20 falsely detected ASes over a three-month period, or one every
few days. Although this false positive rate is clearly too high to automate critical decisions
such as take-down efforts, ASwatch can still be used to significantly narrow down the set of
ASes for further investigation considerably, and can thus help both law enforcement focus
their investigation efforts, and network administrators make decisions on who to peer with
or which abuse complaints to prioritize.
Evaluation outside the training period, over nearly three years: As described in Sec-
tion 5.4.1, we use our model to test new ASes observed after the training period, over nearly
three years, from 2011 to 2013. It is important to notice that, from a control-plane point of
view, malicious ASes may not always be behaving maliciously across a three year period
of time. Our ground truth information does not allow us to distinguish between the periods
of activity and periods of “dormancy”. Nonetheless, over time an AS operated by cyber-
criminals will likely behave in a noticeably different way, compared to legitimate ASes,
allowing us to detect it. Figure 27 shows the cumulative true positive rate of detected ASes
over the testing period. At the end of this nearly three years period, ASwatch reached a true
positive rate of 72% (21 out of 29 ASes correctly flagged as malicious).
To compute the false positives, for each month we count the number of distinct ASes
that were detected as malicious. The false positives reach at most ten to fifteen ASes
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per month, which we believe is a manageable number, because these cases can be further
reviewed by network operators and law enforcement. For instance, the upstream providers
of an AS that is flagged as malicious by ASwatch may take a closer look at its customer’s
activities and time-to-response for abuse complaints. Furthermore, the output of ASwatch
could be combined with the reputation score assigned by existing data-plane based AS
reputation systems. The intuition is that if an AS behaves maliciously both at the control
plane (as detected by ASwatch) and at the data plane (as detected by existing reputation
systems), it is more likely that the AS is in fact operated by cyber-criminals.
How early can ASwatch detect malicious ASes before they are widely noticed? We
want to evaluate if ASwatch can detect malicious ASes before they were reported by blog ar-
ticles. For each of the 14 malicious ASes that ASwatch detected during the cross-validation
experiments discussed earlier, we took note of the day that ASwatch first detected the mali-
cious AS, and we measured the number of days between the time ASwatch detected the AS
and the day the blog story was published. About 85% of the detected malicious ASes were
detected by ASwatch 50 to 60 days before their story became public.
Which features are the most important? We evaluate the strength of each family of fea-
tures that ASwatch uses. To understand which features are most important for ASwatch, we
evaluate each family’s contribution to the overall true and false positive rates. In particular,
we want to study the effect of each family of features on the detection of malicious ASes,
independently from the other families, and the effect of each family on the false positives
when those features are excluded. To this end, we repeated the experiment described previ-
ously by excluding one family of features at a time. We repeated the experiment four times,
once for each family of features, and we calculated the overall detection and false positive
rates. Figure 25 shows the results of our experiments, which suggest that the rewiring fea-
tures are very important, because excluding them significantly lowers the detection rate.
The BGP dynamics and IP address space churn and fragmentation features help reduce the
false positives slightly (the “Only Rewiring” ROC in Figure 25(a) is slightly shifted to the
right). We followed a similar procedure to identify which features are most important for
each family of features. Table 12 shows the most important features for each family.
Is ASwatch sensitive to parameter tuning? As explained in Sections 5.3.3.2, 5.4.2 we
use the following parameters to classify an AS as malicious: (1) feature vectors window
size: we compute feature vectors for an AS for a window of m consecutive days (one
feature vector per day), and we repeat the feature computation over l consecutive sliding
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Only BGP Routing Dyn.
Only IP Fragm. & Churn
(a) Considering each feature family separately.




























Excluding BGP Routing Dyn.
Excluding IP Fragm. & Churn
(b) Excluding one feature family at a time.
Figure 25: Relative importance of different types of features. The rewiring features
contribute the most to the overall detection rate; other features contribute to lower false
positive rates.





































Figure 26: The detection and false positive rates for ASwatch, if we vary the size of the
sliding window. Our experiments show that the performance is not greatly affected.
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windows of size m. (2) recent snapshots: we compute the rewiring features for an AS over
the k most recent snapshots of AS relationships.
To tune our parameters, we performed several pilot experiments, rather than an exhaus-
tive search over the entire parameter space. Our pilot experiments showed that ASwatch’s
performance is robust to both parameters m and l. Due to space limitations, we only show
our experiments for the parameter m. Figure 26 shows the performance for window sizes
of 5, 10, 15, and 20 days. Our results show that the accuracy of ASwatch is not overly sen-
sitive to the choice of window size m. The ROC plots in Figure 26 show that m = 15 gives
a higher true positive rate with a reasonable false positive rate. We therefore set m = 15.
Using a similar approach, we set l = 5. We classify an AS as malicious, if it scores lower
than the detection threshold over five consecutive periods of 15 days.
After we have selected parameters m and l, we proceed to set parameter k. Suppose
that we want to compute the reputation of an ASA, over period T . Then, parameter k is the
number of most recent AS relationship snapshots, prior to T , over which we compute the
rewiring features forA (notice that our AS relationships dataset consists of one snapshot per
month, as mentioned in Section 5.4.1). In other words, k denotes “how much” history we
consider, to capture the rewiring behavior for A. Ideally, we want to accurately capture A’s
rewiring behavior while using a small number of snapshots. We performed experiments
using different values of k (i.e., 1, 2, 3, 4). We then selected k = 4, because further
increasing its value did not produce a significant increase in classification accuracy.
5.4.4 Comparison to BGP Ranking
We now compare ASwatch with BGP Ranking. In contrast to ASwatch, BGP Ranking is
an AS reputation system based on data-plane features (e.g., observations of attack traffic
enabled by machines hosted within an AS). Clearly, BGP Ranking is an AS reputation
system that is designed differently from ASwatch, because it aims to report ASes that are
most heavily abused by cyber-criminals, but not necessarily operated by cyber-criminals.
We compare the two systems for two reasons: (1) to test how many of the malicious ASes
that are operated by cyber-criminals show enough data-plane evidence of maliciousness
and get detected by existing data-plane based AS reputation systems; and (2) to evaluate
whether the control-plane based approach can effectively complement data-plane based AS
reputation systems.
Results summary. We found that ASwatch detected 72% of our set of malicious ASes
over a three year period, and BGP Ranking detected about 34%. Both systems reported
the same rate of false positives (on average 2.5% per month, which is ten to fifteen ASes
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per month). Combining the two systems we were able to detect only 14% of the malicious
ASes, but we were able to reduce the false positives to 0.08% per month (12 ASes in total
across the three year period).
BGP Ranking reports. BGP Ranking [13] has been making its AS reputation scores
publicly available since 2011, along with a description of the approach used to compute the
scores. BGP Ranking currently has information for a total of 14k ASes, and they announce
a daily list of the worst 100 ASes by reputation score. The BGP Ranking score has a
minimum value of 1 (which indicates that the AS hosts benign activity) but no maximum
value (the more malicious traffic hosted by the AS, the higher the score).
Using our list of confirmed cases of malicious ASes (Section 5.4.1), we checked which
ASes are visible from BGP Routeviews starting from 2011. We found a total of 29 ASes.
We chose to check which ASes are active since January 2011, because this is the oldest date
for which BGP Ranking has data available. Then, we tracked these ASes until November
2013, because the historic AS relationships dataset from CAIDA has a gap from November
2013 to August 2014. Therefore, we collected the historical scores for each active known
malicious AS from BGP Ranking, from January 2011 until the end of 2013.
ASwatch setup. Using ASwatch, we generate the feature vectors for each AS in our list,
starting from January 2011 until November 2013. To generate the feature vectors, we
follow the same procedure as described in Section 5.3.3.2. We train ASwatch as previously
described (on training data collected in 2010) and test the ASes observed from 2011 to
2013 against the model.
Comparing BGP Ranking with ASwatch. As mentioned earlier, BGP Ranking is not
a detection system per se, in that it aims to report ASes that host a high concentration
of malicious activities, and does not focus on distinguishing between abused ASes and
ASes that are instead owned and operated by cyber-criminals. Nonetheless, for the sake of
comparison it is possible to obtain a detection system by setting a threshold on the score
output by BGP Ranking. BGP Ranking publishes the set of “worst” 100 ASes and their
scores, which are updated daily (to obtain the historic scores for any other non-top-100
AS, one has to make explicit queries through the web portal). It also reports the average
AS score per country or region, and ranks the countries that host the ASes with the lowest
reputation. The four top (“worst”) countries are Russia, Ukraine, Hong Kong, and the
US. Using the above information we consider five distinct detection thresholds as follows:










































































Figure 27: True positive rates for ASwatch and BGP Ranking. Accumulation of detected
ASes over nearly three years.
ASes in Ukraine (BGP Ranking Ukraine cut-off), (3) average score for Hong Kong (BGP
Ranking Hong Kong cut-off), and (4) average score for ASes in the US (BGP Ranking US
cut-off). We also set a threshold based on the average score of the 100th worst AS (BGP
Ranking top 100) collected from the daily reports. Figure 27 shows the detection results
using these thresholds.
We then compared BGP Ranking’s detection with that of ASwatch. Figure 27 shows
the fraction of ASes that ASwatch and BGP Ranking detected. We show the cumulative
fraction of detected ASes, from January 2011 to November 2013. At the end of the 35-
month period, ASwatch detected about 72% of the set of ASes we tracked, while BGP
Ranking detected about 34%. We found that 72% of the malicious ASes were detected
by monitoring their control-plane behavior, but only 34% of the malicious ASes showed
enough data-plane activity to be detected by BGP Ranking. BGP Ranking may have only
limited visibility of malicious activities in the data plane across the entire Internet, and thus
may completely miss the malicious activities of certain ASes. Naturally, it is challenging to
deploy a large number of sensors dedicated to detecting malicious network communications
over the entire Internet. On the other hand, ASwatch monitors BGP behavior, and may
therefore compensate the limited visibility of data-plane based approaches.
We also compared the false positive rates of BGP Ranking and ASwatch. Our moti-
vation is to see if the false positives are manageable within a reasonable period of time
(e.g.one month). We collected the ASwatch scores and the BGP Ranking scores for our set
of legitimate ASes (see Section 5.4.1). For each system, we counted the number of legiti-
mate ASes that ASwatch detected per month. We found that both systems produce only ten
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to fifteen false positives per month on average over the total of 389 known legitimate ASes
in our dataset. As we have mentioned earlier, BGP Ranking is designed differently from
ASwatch. Although the rate we calculated does not represent the actual false positive rate
for BGP ranking, it does provide an estimate of the false positive that an operator would
need to deal with, if BGP Ranking were used to detect malicious ASes.
Combining control-plane with data-plane. Finally, we evaluated how the two systems
would perform if we used them together. To this end, we label an AS as malicious if it
was reported by both systems, with each two report dates to be at most six months apart
from each other. For BGP Ranking we used the BGP Ranking top 100 threshold. We
found that combining the two systems, we were able to detect 14% of our malicious ASes.
This means that of 14% of the known malicious ASes exhibited both control plane and
data plane malicious behavior within six months. The fraction of legitimate ASes that both
systems detected as malicious is only 3% (i.e., 12 ASes out of 389) for the whole three year
period (which is on average 0.08% per month). Finally, five out of the 29 known malicious
ASes that were active in the three year observation period were missed by both systems.
For example, AS 49544 (Interactive 3D) and AS 39858 (UninetMd, now Comstar Volga
Arzamas) are among the top worst ASes that both systems detected.
5.5 Discussion
ASwatch reputation scores in practice . ASwatch may help the work of network oper-
ators and security practitioners as follows: (1) Prioritize traffic: knowing what ASes have
suspicious (low reputation) control-plane behavior may help administrators to appropri-
ately handle traffic originating from such ASes; (2) Peering decisions: Upstream providers
could use AS reputation scores as an additional source of information to make peering de-
cisions, for example by charging higher costs to compensate for the risk of having a low
reputation customer or even de-peer early if reputation scores drop significantly; (3) Prior-
itize investigations: law enforcement and security practitioners may prioritize their inves-
tigations and start early monitoring on low reputation ASes; (4) Complement data-plane
based systems: ASwatch could be used in combination with data-plane based reputation
systems, so that ASes that exhibit malicious behavior both from the control-and data-plane
points of view can be prioritized first; (5) Strengthen existing defenses: furthermore, repu-
tation could be used as input to other network defenses (e.g., spam filters, botnet detection
systems) to improve their detection accuracy.
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Working with limited ground truth. We briefly summarize the challenges that we faced
due to limited ground truth, and how we mitigated them. (1) Highly unbalanced dataset:
The ratio of malicious ASes to legitimate ASes produced a highly unbalanced dataset.
Before training we used well-known data mining approaches to balance the dataset, by
oversampling the underrepresented class of malicious ASes (Section 5.4.1). (2) Limited
time period for training: We relied on the date of the ground truth reports to estimate the
period of time in which the ASes were likely to be actively used by the attackers. We were
not able to obtain additional information about the activity periods (or dormancy periods)
outside the report dates. Therefore, we designed AS ASwatch so that it does not make a
final decision for an AS based on a single observation (i.e., a single feature vector). Instead,
we introduced parameters to ensure that we label an AS as malicious only if it is assigned
consistently low scores for an extended period of time. (3) Model update with adaptive
training: Because of the lack of information on the activity periods (or dormancy periods)
outside the report dates, we were not able to periodically update our model. Therefore,
we performed a one-time training on our model using a period of time (January–March
2010) for which we had “clean” data. Even though ASwatch uses observations of cases of
malicious ASes in 2010, we believe that it effectively models fundamental characteristics
of malicious ASes that are still reflected on today’s cases. This belief is supported in
part by the results of correlating ASwatch’s output with recent BGP Ranking reports (see
Section 5.4). In our future work, we plan to investigate more sources of ground truth and
identify other periods of time that could be included in our training.
Limitations of the AS relationships dataset. To measure our rewiring features, we re-
lied on a dataset that provides snapshots of AS relationships over years (see Section 5.4.1).
The relationship inference algorithm is based on the idea of customer cones—the set of
ASes an AS can reach through its customer links. This dataset has its own set of limita-
tions. For example, each pair of ASes is assigned only a single relationship, and visibility
is limited to the monitoring points publicly available via Routeviews. It is possible that
some business relationships may be missing, or that some false relationships are reported.
Moreover, since the dataset is provided in snapshots (one snapshot per month), we are not
able to observe rewiring activity that may be happening at a finer time scales. Nevertheless,
this AS relationships dataset has the largest validated collection of AS relationships gath-
ered to date, with about 44,000 (34.6%) of the inferences validated, and it reports the AS
relationships over years, which allowed us to track our ground truth ASes over an extended
period of time.
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Evasion. Naturally, as for any other detection system, ASwatch may face the challenge
of sophisticated attackers who attempt to evade it. For example, an attacker may attempt
to manage her AS to mimic the BGP behavior of legitimate ASes. However, we should
notice that ASwatch relies heavily on rewiring features, which capture how an AS connects
with other ASes, including upstream providers. Mimicking legitimate behavior to evade
ASwatch would mean that the malicious AS has to become “less agile”. In turn, being
less agile may expose the AS to de-peering by its upstream providers as a consequence of
accumulating abuse complaints. For example, if McColo (which was taken down in 2008)
had not changed ten upstream providers before it was taken down, it might have been taken
down much sooner.
Future work. We plan to expand our set of features to capture other types of behavior,
such as making peering arrangements for specific prefixes. We intend to expand our sources
of bullet-proof hosting ASes, so that we test ASwatch over larger datasets and longer peri-
ods of time. We also plan to explore how we may combine our set of control plane features
with data plane features.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented ASwatch, the first system to derive AS reputation based on control-
plane behavior. ASwatch is based on the intuition that malicious ASes exhibit “agile”
control-plane behavior (e.g., short-lived routes, aggressive rewiring). We evaluated ASwatch
on known malicious ASes and found that it detected 93% of malicious ASes with a 5% false
positive rate. When comparing to BGP Ranking, the current state-of-the-art AS reputation
system, we found that ASwatch detected 72% of reported malicious ASes, whereas BGP
ranking detected only 34%. These results suggest that ASwatch can better help network op-
erators and law enforcement take swifter action against these ASes that continue to remain
sources of malicious activities. Possible remediations could be assessing the risk of peering





6.1 Summary of contributions
This thesis has demonstrated that it is possible to counteract internet infrastructures that
support cybercrime, by designing an AS reputation system that, unlike existing approaches,
monitors the control-plane behavior of ASes. Below we summarize our contributions:
• Empirical study of the dynamics of fast-flux service networks. We studied a rep-
resentative DNS based infrastructure, as it was used to host point-of-sale sites for
email scam campaigns. We actively monitored the DNS records for URLs for spam
advertised scam campaigns. We studied the rates of change in fast-flux networks,
the locations in the DNS hierarchy that change, and the extent to which the fast-flux
network infrastructure is shared across different campaigns.
• We presented the first systematic study of the re-wiring dynamics of malicious ASes.
We tracked Hostexploit-listed ASes, and compared their AS-level re-wiring dynam-
ics with non-listed ASes. We used a publicly available dataset of Customer-Provider
(CP) relations in the Internets AS graph, we studied how interconnection between
autonomous systems evolves, both for reported and non-reported ASes.
• We presented a fundamentally different approach to establishing AS reputation. We
designed and implemented a system, ASwatch, that aims to identify malicious ASes
using exclusively control-plane data (i.e., the BGP routing control messages ex-
changed between ASes using BGP). Unlike existing data-plane based reputation sys-
tems, ASwatch explicitly aims to identify malicious ASes, rather than assigning low
reputation to legitimate ASes that have unfortunately been abused.
6.2 Lessons learned and future work
Below we list some lessons we have learned, that may be useful for designing systems to
defend against cybercriminal infrastructures:
Defenses against victim engagement. This thesis focused on counteracting cyber-
crime infrastructures. Even though it is important to design systems that help towards this
goal, it is also important to design defenses to help against victim engagement. An impor-
tant part of cybercriminals’ efforts is to engage end users into various activities, with the
76
ultimate goal to make profit: (1) either directly, for example engage users to buy products
from illicit businesses, or (2) indirectly, for example engage a user to install malware that
compromises his machine and operate as a spam. It would help to design early warning
systems, to warn the end users in a timely manner when such operations are under the way.
Need for systems that target cybercrime monetization operations and infrastruc-
ture. Leontiadis et al. [57–61] empirically identified the following common components
across these different types of criminal businesses. To defend against cybercriminal in-
frastructures, it would help to design defense systems that target to identify components of
cybercriminal infrastructures that play an important role for monetization purposes.
Bringing together complementary defense systems. The research community has
developed multiple defense approaches that operate on different, often non-overlapping,
areas. For example, significant research effort has focused on critical parts of DNS-based
infrastructures [8, 71, 75, 77]. Other efforts have focused on identifying evidence of mali-
ciousness [12,90,101], or mismanaged networks [113]. Even though each approach is very
effective in targeting specific aspects of cybercrime operations, it may be useful, if we bring
those systems together. For example, it may be useful to design an approach that attempts
to counteract cybercriminal infrastructures on multiple levels by: (1) monitoring evidence
of maliciousness on the routing level, (2) collecting evidence of maliciousness on the data-
plane level (traffic monitoring evidence), (3) collecting indications of mismanagement, and
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